Lecture 11: What We Owe to Each Other

(or Why We’re All Horrible People)

The Issue

Several of the topics we have considered over the course of the term raise the question of what we owe to each other.

To what extent does morality require that we look out for other people?

E.g., Sustainable development

Water safety

Environmental Protection

Opinions in this Class

Judging by the commentaries so far, opinion is split in this class

A significant minority think we owe a great deal to others, even if this involves a substantial sacrifice on our part

Most think that we have some obligation to others, but that when helping others starts to hurt us, that obligation ceases.

Today’s Topic

The question ‘what do we owe to each other?’ might be thought of as the central question in ethics

Is it an alternate version of the question ‘how should I live?’

Today we will explore an argument in favour of the idea that we owe a great deal to one another.

Whether you accept this position or not, the argument provides an excellent opportunity to test out your reasons for holding your own view on the topic.

Arguing that We Owe a Lot to One Another

Based on an argument by Peter Singer

Presented as a series of premises leading to a conclusion

Premise 1: Death due to lack of food, shelter and medical care are, in general, bad

Premise 2

Premise 2: "if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally to do it." 

Is this reasonable?

Final Premises and Conclusion

Premise 3:  It is in our power to prevent a significant amount of death due to lack of food, shelter and medical care simply by giving up many of the luxuries we enjoy.

Premise 4:  Ensuring that our present level of luxury does not decrease at all is not a morally significant thing.

Conclusion:  We ought, morally, to give up many of the luxuries we enjoy and donate the money/resources that are freed up to charity.

Is This Convincing?

Some Objections:

Why should I do this, when hardly anyone else will?

It’s not my fault that the world is full of suffering.

Whatever I do will just be a drop in the bucket.

Others…?

Another Way Around the Argument

Consider the following principle:

The Consistency Principle: ‘if you are obligated to act one way in some particular situation, call it situation A and you are not obligated to act in that same way in some other situation, call it situation B, there must be some morally significant difference between the two situations.'

Two Scenarios

The Shallow Pond:  On your way to give a lecture, you notice a child drowning in a shallow pond.  You can save the child, but if you do you will either have to cancel your lecture or give it in wet clothes. You decide to let the child drown.

The Envelope:  You receive a letter from a reputable charity telling you that, if you send a donation of $50, 5 children will be saved who would otherwise die.  You decide you don't want to and toss the envelope in the trash.

What Should We Say About the Cases?

Premise 1:  The consistency principle is true.

Premise 2: You acted wrongly in The Shallow Pond case. 

Premise 3:  Morally speaking, the Shallow Pond and the Envelope are identical.

Conclusion:  You acted wrongly in the Envelope case.

In other words, 'charity' is mandatory here.

What Does This Show?

Effectively, the 2 cases provide another version of Singer’s original argument.

They, arguably, show that when it comes to saving lives we are morally obligated to make at least some sacrifices.

But this argument can be pushed even further…

Pushing the Argument

What if we modify the cases?

You receive an Envelope on Monday and another on Tuesday

You see a child in the Pond on Monday and another on Tuesday

Now it seems you are morally obligated to sacrifice more

What if we push the cases to 3 or 4 or …?

How Much is Enough?

At a certain point, you may get to say you’ve done enough.

But it seems that you'd have to give an awful lot in order to have done enough.

Consider how many drowning children you would have had to rescue before we’d say you had done enough.

Answering the Objections

Why should I do this, when hardly anyone else will?

Suppose there are lots of people standing around the shallow pond not helping. Are you therefore off the hook?

It’s not my fault that the world is full of suffering.

It’s not your fault that the child is in the pond. Are you therefore off the hook?

Answering the Objections

Whatever I do will just be a drop in the bucket.

Suppose there are more drowning children in the pond than you can possible save. Do you therefore get to say: ‘I can’t save them all, so there’s no sense saving any’?

Other objections?

Putting You in the Envelope

The claim made by the charity in the Envelope is true. 

A donation of $50 to UNICEF can save the lives of a number of children who would otherwise die.  You can donate to UNICEF by calling (416) 482-4444 or writing to them at 443 Mount Pleasant Road, Toronto, ON M4S 2L8.

Now, what do you do?

The Strong Version of Singer’s Argument

There’s an even stronger version of the argument that’s also somewhat plausible. The difference lies in premise 2.

Premise 2: "if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally to do it." 

P2:  (Strong Version)  "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it."

This seems to suggest a need to give up all luxuries

The Strong Version I

P1:  Death due to lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad.

P2:  (Strong Version)  "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it."

The Strong Version Part II

P3:  It is in our power to prevent a significant amount of death due to lack of food, shelter and medical care simply by giving up all luxuries.

P4:  Our enjoyment of luxuries is not of comparable moral importance to the lives we could save if gave those luxuries up.

C:  We ought, morally, to give up all luxuries and donate the money/resources that are freed up to charity.