Plato – Euthyphro

Euthyphro's Boast: "S – … you have no fear of having acted impiously in bringing your father to trial?
E – I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would not be superior to the majority of men, if I did not have accurate knowledge of all such things." (8)

Socrates' Reaction:  S – "… [Then] I should become your pupil …
E – …Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and if he [Meletus, i.e., Socrates' accuser] should try to indict me, I think I would find his weak spots and the talk in court would be about him rather than about me." (9)

Posing the Question: "S – … is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents us with one form or appearance in so far as it is impious?
E – Most certainly, Socrates.
S – Tell me then, what is the pious and the impious, do you say?" (9)

They are to search for a universal definition of piety. This search for the essence of a particular concept (usually an ethical one) is characteristic of early Socratic dialogues. *********************************

Definition #1: "E – I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious." (9)

Euthyphro quotes the example of Zeus as evidence for this. Criticizing Definition #1: "S – … you did not teach me adequately when I asked you what the pious was, but you told me that what you are doing now, prosecuting your father for murder, is pious.
E – And I told the truth, Socrates.
…
S – Bear in mind that I did not bid you to tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form, or don't you remember?" (10)
What exactly is bothering Socrates here?
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Definition #2: "E – … what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious." (11)

Criticizing Definition #2: "S – We have also stated that the gods are in a state of discord, that they are at odds with each other, Euthyphro, and that they are at enmity with each other. Has that, too, been said?
E – It has.
S – What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger? Let us look at it this way. If you and I were to differ about number as to which is the greater, would this difference make us enemies and angry with each other, or would we proceed to count and soon resolve our difference about this?" (11)

About what will the gods be at odds then? About what is "beautiful, ugly, good, and bad", i.e., about evaluative questions.

Problem: "S – The same things then are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and would be both god-loved and god-hated.
E – It seems likely.
S – And the same things would be both pious and impious, according to this argument?" (12)

 Euthyphro's Response: "E – I think, Socrates, that on this subject no gods would differ from one another, that whoever has killed anyone unjustly should pay the penalty." (12)
  Why is this an unsatisfying response? *************************************

Definition #3: "the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate is the impious" (14)

Criticizing Definition #3:

Socrates' Question: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" (14) What’s the answer? "S – I shall try to explain more clearly: we speak of something being carried and something carrying, of something being led and something leading, of something being seen and something seeing, and you understand that these things are all different from one another and how they differ?

E – I think I do" (14)
 

What's the point of this passage? To say something is being carried is to say nothing more than that someone carries it. To say something is being led is to say no more than something is leading, etc.

By analogy to say something is being loved (by the gods, for instance) is to say nothing more than that someone loves it (i.e., the gods).

So what? Why should we care?

 The problem is that to say the pious is loved by the gods is to say nothing more than that they do love it. The leftover question is: why do they love it?


The Answer: "S – Is it [the pious] loved because it is pious, or for some other reason?

E – For no other reason" (15)
 

Why is this a bad answer? ******************************************

Euthyphro is talking in circles. So far, he's told us:

(1) The pious is that which all the gods love.

(2) The gods love the things they do because those things are pious.

But these two claims together aren't very illuminating.
Since we're told at #1 that the pious = that which all the gods love, all #2 really says is that "The gods love the things they do because those things are that which all the gods love."

As Socrates says, "when you were asked what piety is, you did not wish to make its nature clear to me, but you told me an affect or quality of it". (16)

*********************************

A Brief Digression - Divine Command Theory

Divine Command Theory = an act is morally right if God approves of it; an act is morally wrong if God disapproves of it; an act is morally neutral if God neither approves nor disapproves of it

Think about how 'the Euthyphro Problem' applies to this theory.

Does God approve of things because they are right or are they right because he approves of them?

Option #1: God approves of them because they're right. If so,then DCT is incomplete. It doesn't tell us why these things are right.

Option #2: They're right because God approves of them. But then isn't morality arbitrary? Incest would have been morally right if God approved of it.

Why isn't the following a good response?  'But God would never approve of incest (or murder or whatever).'
***********************

Socrates Suggests a New Direction:

"S – … See whether you think all that is pious is of necessity just.
E – I think so.
S – And is then all that is just pious? Or is all that is pious just, but not all that is just pious, but some of it is and some is not?" (17)  
What's he talking about? " S – … where there is piety there is also justice, but where there is justice there is not always piety, for the pious is a part of justice.
…
if the pious is a part of the just, we must, it seems find out what part of the just it is. Now if you asked me something of what we mentioned just now, such as what part of number is the even, and what number that is, I would say that it is the number that is divisible into two equal, not unequal, parts." (18)
  What Socrates is describing here is definition by genus and specific difference. This is a way of giving a definition we'll see more of. ***************************

Definition by Genus and Specific Difference: Defining a word or expression by identifying a class (i.e., the genus) the word or expression falls into and explaining how this particular word or expression differs from the other members of the class (i.e., explaining the specific difference). By pointing out this difference, we identify a species within the genus.

E.g. (1) The even can be defined as a "number that is divisible into two equal … parts". Here, number is the genus while the specific difference is that we are concerned only with those members of the genus which can be divided equally in two.

(2) Courtney Cox can be defined as the member of the cast of Friends who is married to David Arquette. Here, the genus is the cast of Friends and the specific difference is being married to David Arquette.

 
What are the limitations of this approach to giving definitions? **********************************

Euthyphro Attempts to Define Piety By Genus and Specific Difference: "the godly and the pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice." (18)

What does he mean by 'caring' for the gods?

"S – So dogs are benefited by dog breeding, cattle by cattle raising, and so with all the others. ...
Is piety then, which is the care of the gods, also to benefit the gods and make them better? Would you agree that when you do something pious you make some one of the gods better?
E – By Zeus, no. … that is not the kind of care I mean." (19)

 
What kind of care does Euthyphro mean?


"E -- the kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their masters.
S -- I understand. It is likely to be a kind of service of the gods.
E -- Quite so." (19)
What's the goal of this service?
"S -- What about service to shipbuilders? To what achievement is it directed?
E -- Clearly, Socrates, to the building of a ship?
S -- And service to housebuilders to the building of a house?...
S -- Tell me then, by Zeus, what is that excellent aim that the Gods achieve, using us as their servants?
E -- Many fine things, Socrates...
E -- ... to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the Gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions ... The opposite of these pleasing actions are impious and overturn and destroy everything." (20)
*************************

Definition #4:

"S -- ... Once more then, what do you say that piety and the pious are? Are they a knowledge of how to sacrifice and pray?
E -- They are.
S -- To sacrifice is to make a gift to the gods, whereas to pray is to beg from the gods?
E -- Definitely, Socrates.
S -- It would follow from this statement that piety would be a knowledge of how to give to, and beg from, the gods." (20)


Criticizing Definition #4:

"S: ... to beg correctly would be to ask from them [i.e., the Gods] things that we need?
E -- What else?
S -- And to give correctly is to give them what they need from us ...
E -- True, Socrates.
S -- Piety would then be a sort of trading skill between gods and men...
S -- ... What they give us is obvious to all. There is for us no good that we do not receive from then, but how are they benefitted by what they receive from us?" (20-1)
Here's what they receive from us: "honour, reverence, and ... gratitude" (21)

But they're not benefitted by it: "S -- The pious is then, Euthyphro, pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?
E -- I think it is of all things most dear to them.
S -- So the pious is once again what is dear to the gods." (21)

But we've been here before and have already decided this definition didn't work.

**********************

The End: Socrates continues to be willing to investigate the question. He continues to act as though Euthyphro has the answer but is holding out on him.

"E -- Some other time, Socrates, for I am in a hurry now, and it is time for me to go." (22)
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How might we answer the question 'What is the morally right way to act?'

A currently popular response: it's a mistake to think that there is a single right answer to this question. Morality is relative. What is morally right in one place and /or time might not be right in another. Call this view moral relativism.

Is it a reasonable view?

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