Community service: Status Report on Atlantic Cod in Canada

[this is the "MORE" page from where you just were (use "back" button to get back there). Click to see issue detailed from fishery through mismanagement and coverup to SARA, or press coverage]

"One of the most bizarre features of any advanced industrial society in our time is that the cardinal choices have to be made by a handful of men: in secret: and, at least in legal form, by men who cannot have a first-hand knowledge of what those choices depend upon or what their results may be."
(Snow, C. P., 1962. Science and government: the Godkin lectures at Harvard University, 1960. New York: New American Library / Mentor by arrangement with Harvard University Press).

This work brought lessons on a different level from the original question. The lessons relate to how proper process can be maintained, and also to our teaching objectives.
    We tend to view crises as acute rather than chronic, i.e. one at a time, instead of focusing on the soil in which virtually all problems must take root if they are to get out of control, as the Cod issue did (resulting in the collapse of a fishery, then the breach of procedures and laws to keep the lid on it).
    If we want to get rid of flies, instead of just swatting at each fly we must go and clean out the mess they breed in. So, view this tale not only for the importance it has for conservation of Cod, but also as an example giving insight into what lets problems grow and multiply. Like the recently-publicised 'sponsorship' scandals (the Gomery inquiry report is awaited), it is obvious and trite to say that ethics were lacking. Less obviously, the key fertiliser for most problems is secrecy and the consequent lack of scrutiny.
    As ecologists we want to help avert problems, and help correct problems. But we need to recognise the 'ecology of human decisionmaking' and we need to understand how that prevents sensible measures from being taken in good time. We need to teach for better ethics, teach how to analyse, and teach how to deal ethically and effectively with complex situations.

The Status Report was commissioned by COSEWIC itself*. It was considered at the April 1998 meeting of COSEWIC (Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada), and Cod in Canada was designated 'Vulnerable'.
      (COSEWIC asked me, I declined. They asked again; I suggeted others, they asked again and said they wanted someone "not currently publishing on cod". I didn't see how I could refuse a legitimate question asked by an agency that claimed to operate purely scientifically and not politically (or I was too green); I did it on a voluntary/honorarium (supplied by WWF) basis. The report received very positive peer-reviews from leading scientists, but the process, including the basis of designation, was heavily influenced by politics (e.g. bureaucratic delays and even alterations to the report's text) even though it is mandated (SARA) to be driven by the best available scientific information.)

This was the first Canadian designation of a commercial marine species.

The report was extensively covered in the media, with interviews in print press and radio (including CBC's As It Happens). A few key items are:

Boychuk, R. 1997. Order of Nature (editorial). Canadian Geographic, July/August: , p. 9.

Boychuk, R. 1998. Bringing Bell back. Canadian Geographic, May/June: , p. 9.

Bueckert, D. 1997. Report says feds interfered with endangered cod decision. The Evening Telegram, St. John's. Friday, June 20, 1997, p. 14.

Comeau, P. 1997. Confidential report calls Atlantic cod endangered. Canadian Geographic, July/August: , p. 18-22. (archive)

Comeau, P. 1998. 'Put cod on endangered list' - Scientist says once-abundant fish faces extinction, and DFO won't admit it. Ottawa Citizen, Ottawa. Saturday April 18, 1998, p. A1, A4.

Enman, C. 1998. Cod put on endangered list - listing as 'vulnerable' is a first for a commercial fish species. Ottawa Citizen, Ottawa. Saturday, April 25, 1998, p. A1, A2.

Sheppard, R. 1997. As the fish shrink. Globe and Mail, Toronto. June 19, p. A19.

The Report is also cited in an authoritative book on the issue:

Harris, M. 1998. Lament for an ocean: the collapse of the Atlantic cod fishery: a true crime story. Toronto: MacClelland and Stewart, Inc. 342 pp.

The front-page article (Comeau 18 April 1998) in the Ottawa Citizen gives the history of the report up to just before the April '98 meeting; that and other articles can be found at http://www.ottawacitizen.com/search/. At the 1998 meeting cod was declared "Vulnerable", a designation that was falsely optimistic compared to what could have been given to most of the populations individually. To accomplish this COSEWIC had to ignore key evidence documented in the Report. DFO pressured COSEWIC to treat cod according to a single- or homogeneous-population concept, despite that:
    [1] this was counter to strong evidence published by DFO and other sources (and quoted in the report) that showed otherwise, and also despite that
    [2] COSEWIC's own rules require(d*) that any doubt be resolved by taking the view that allowed the greatest risk to be acknowledged, i.e. that if multiple populations were uncertain but possible, then multiple populations should be independently addressed. (*1990s-2002 approximately; they've changed their rules now to let them do what they like, and some of the changes/practices are illegal because they violate SARA legislation.)
    [3] Most ironically the "single-unit" concept was counter to DFO's vigorous insistence (letter from W Doubleday 23 Dec 1996) that population structure should not be "cavalierly ignored"; the letter even explained (correctly) that COSEWIC's rules permitted populations to be separately listed. DFO would never answer why or when (sometime between Dec 23 96 and April 97) it changed its mind. COSEWIC never even asked the question.

The issue of political input into scientific decisions has implications for conservation and illustrates the need for a wider understanding of and teaching, not only of science, but also of ethics. As powerfully argued by the eminent physicist C.P. Snow in the context of science strategy during WW II (Snow, C.P. 1962. Science and government. New York: New American Library / Mentor (by arrangement with Harvard University Press) vii+128 pp), the uninformed prioritisation of ideas and information can put critical goals at risk.

2002 POSTSCRIPT: Prominent scientists now doubt that Cod will ever recover to their 1960s levels. (The simplicity and finality of such pessimism is regrettable. The spatial patchiness in trends over time is compelling evidence of the complex population structure and genetic diversity that is probably for the most part lost. Instead of pessimism that legitimises inaction, we need to aggressively investigate the nature of the collapses, the nature of the persistences of some local populations, and see if we cannot arrive at an understanding of the biology that will let us move towards a biologically assisted recovery. )

2003 POSTSCRIPT: my 1998 report was updated by a COSEWIC insider. The 2003 update does not even reference the 98 Report, which is a departure from practice because all other updates seen have referenced the previous reports.
    COSEWIC has finally in part followed my original recommendations to (I) use quantitative measures as indices of endangerment -- this had been sufficiently novel at the time that a federal cabinet minister lobbied provincial counterparts to influence their delegates against it, (II) designate cod by populations and not as one all-encompassing unit -- this had been fought by DFO despite that DFO originally asked for it, and (III) designate some of those populations "Endangered".

However, COSEWIC remains reluctant in its consideration of populations, and still kept the 2003 update to only 3 coarse marine geographic units (plus one for Arctic). That makes it even coarser than the management areas long used by DFO, and so the coarse units likely contain multiple populations within them. COSEWIC claims a purely scientific modus operandi, so what motive would it have to go against that by choosing the coarse approach? Accommodation of DFO, the biggest cheese in COSEWIC. How did the coarse approach help DFO? (1) It reduced the number of units that could possibly receive a politically embarrassing designation, and (2) due to averaging across populations within each COSEWIC 'unit', an at-risk designation might be made less likely. In 1998 the populations issue was so hot that, although DFO science achieved a strong consensus that populations were important to recognise, some senior DFO bureaucrats refused to discuss with the press what was or wasn't a population. Actually the benefit was 3-fold: the broad basis of Listing was so unpopular that it generated public opposition to official acceptance of the Listing, so even yet (2005!) Cabinet clearly wants to refuse a Listing and is (illegally) delaying the process until, presumably, one option or the other loses its political weight; so, with COSEWIC's compliance, DFO has still warded off a Listing.

Despite (finally) in 2003 having gone partway to following my 1998 recommendations, COSEWIC continues to be in violation of its own rules by refusing to release the 1998 report unless it is allowed to make the report "reflect" the decision ("Vulnerable", applied as a single designation for all Altantic Cod in Canada) taken in April 1998. I.e. the decision ignored the facts and recommendations. To COSEWIC, a report is merely an alibi for a decision already made -- a decision which may have little to do with science. The present Chair (2004) actually wrote "You were asked to produce a report that reflected COSEWIC's single assessment of cod as vulnerable ". Releasing the report would make evident the political nature of COSEWIC's 1998 decision.

To support the best decisions from this point forward, there needs to be a concerted effort in fundamental science that will develop an understanding of the current situation and ways to restore groundfish populations. The information generated needs at all stages to be open so that the public can learn about the science and can support plans offering sustainability in the long term.