Security from violence is fundamental for reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, more broadly, for sustainable economic, social and political development (OECD 2004, 2).

Introduction

In 2004, representatives of the twenty-two wealthiest foreign aid donor countries met under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and agreed to the above statement at a meeting that concretized the donor community’s views on the relationship between security and development. It is tempting to think that foreign aid’s recent alliance with security emerged primarily from renewed interest in national security in the wake of the September 2001 attacks on the United States. However, as the introductory chapter in this volume establishes, this assumption overlooks a lengthier dialogue between security and development communities that grew from the early-1990s turn towards human security as an organizing principle for some donors’ aid and their foreign policy objectives.

Throughout this courtship, concerns emerged about how gender issues are addressed in emerging forms of aid programming and approaches to security and conflict in aid policy. In the years since the Donor Assistance Committee (DAC) donors agreed to better integrate security and development, these questions about gender remain. In that statement from the 2004 High Level Meeting, gender and women are mentioned only twice: one reference to the “essential training” of security forces in developing countries in areas including gender equality, and another reference to future donor work on “addressing issues of trafficking of women and children” in conflict situations (OECD 2004: 6). From this inauspicious start, the treatment of gender issues in the emergent security and development agenda has remained peripheral and thus an ongoing concern for many in the aid community.

Research shows that the securitization of aid is correlated with a diminishing focus on gender equality (Swiss 2012b). In response, an international policy discourse has emerged...
arguing for better approaches to gender and Security Sector Reform (GSSR) (Kunz 2014). This chapter examines this space for gender equality in the security and development agenda as it relates to GSSR, not only for normative reasons that gender should be considered, but because aid donor countries have previously committed to address gender in all development assistance and also committed to addressing gender issues in the context of conflict and insecurity.1 The gendered impact of insecurity on development is well documented, including issues as varied as sex-selected massacre and the use of rape as a weapon of war (Baaz and Stern 2009; Carpenter 2006). Thus, this chapter will try to explain the gaps between donor commitment and action by investigating the approaches of three bilateral donors – Canada, Sweden, and the United States – to integrating gender in their security-related aid. First, I briefly track the trajectory of the emergent security and development agenda and the relationship of this agenda to competing priorities for the provision of aid generally. Second, I outline my analytic framework for examining donor approaches to gender in their security-related aid and provide a brief outline of each of the three donors in the context of this framework. Finally, through a comparative case study, I identify three factors which appear to increase the extent to which gender equality is integrated within the security-development agenda: (1) the influence of policy coherence – both within aid agencies and across government agencies – on aid policy; (2) donors’ mobilization of gender-specific resources; and (3) civil society’s influence over donors. My case study shows that Sweden has more coherent aid policy, mobilizes more gender-specific resources, and is more open to civil society influence than either Canada or the United States; in contrast to Sweden, the integration of gender into either Canadian or American security-related aid has been limited at best, although more progress appears to have been made in the US than in Canada. Overall, this chapter argues that the extent to which gender equality is integrated in security-related bilateral aid is an outcome of the interplay of these factors and is closely linked to the way in which aid is employed to further the foreign policy objectives of donor countries.2

Aid and the Security-Development Nexus

Beginning in the 1990s, the global security-development nexus began to evolve owing to the confluence of several key international trends: (1) concerns with the rise of intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War era; (2) evolution of the concept of ‘human security’; and (3) linking of national security and development interests in the post-September 2001 period. The main outcome for aid of this reframing of the security-development nexus was the targeted use of development assistance to promote peace and security (Brown and Grävingholt, Introduction, this volume). This trend was witnessed in the creation of ‘conflict prevention pools’ by DFID (DFID 2004), donors adopting policies on the security-development issue (Sida 2005b), and most significantly, the agreement of all DAC donors to focus on the security-development nexus as the subject of the 2004 DAC High-Level Meeting, resulting in a new focus for donors on Security Sector Reform (SSR) (OECD 2004). Donors adopted these approaches due to a mixture of foreign policy interests and international pressure from organizations like the DAC, leading to

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1 See, for instance, the Beijing Platform for Action and UN Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820.
2 The usage of the terms gender issues and gender equality at times interchangeably in the remainder of this chapter is not intended to conflate the two concepts. I take for granted that most bilateral aid agencies engage with gender and gender issues as a means of supporting eventual gender equality.
the emergence of a rudimentary donor consensus around the security and development agenda (Swiss 2011).

**Gender, Security and Development**

From the 1980s onward, a donor consensus around issues of women and gender in development emerged in a very similar fashion to the security and development agenda described above (Moser and Moser 2005; Rathgeber 1990, 1995; Swiss 2012a). Though implementation varies, support for women’s rights and principles of gender equity are practically ubiquitous among the DAC group of bilateral donors and the major multilateral aid institutions. One of the most prominent ways in which this manifests itself in donor policy and practice is through the process of ‘gender mainstreaming’. Mainstreaming refers to the practice of making gender analysis and the promotion of gender equality a part of all programming and policy within the aid sector (Parpart 2014). By asking questions of the gendered impact of all interventions, rather than only using targeted gender interventions, the impact on gender equality is expected to be more comprehensive. This practice gained widespread acceptance following the Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995, and donors, NGOs, and other aid organizations have made efforts to mainstream gender in all their work (Moser and Moser 2005). This practice has not been without controversy and the reliance on gender mainstreaming has led some to argue that the practice actually diminishes the focus on gender within organizations and can weaken the impact development assistance has on promoting equality (Moser 2005; Tiessen 2007). Despite these shortcomings, gender mainstreaming remains the dominant modality through which donors attempt to address gender in their work. There are also instances of targeted interventions for women’s development and gender equality initiatives, but a survey of DAC aid shows that a much higher proportion of aid has gender as a secondary rather than primary objective (OECD 2010a).

At the global level, gender and security issues have been most prominently integrated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (United Nations 2000). Drawing on the Beijing Platform for Action, this resolution from the year 2000 establishes expectations for UN members and other parties to conflict to integrate gender concerns in all aspects of peace and security operations, post-conflict peacebuilding, and other humanitarian activities linked to conflict. Though not explicit in referring to security-related foreign aid, aspects of security-sector reform and post-conflict initiatives like disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) are included in the resolution, and thus it clearly applies to the context of security-related aid. Subsequently, the UN Security Council has ratified other

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3 Although I alternate between gender concerns and women’s concerns throughout this chapter, it is important to distinguish the concepts theoretically, as they hold different implications for aid donors. Aid approaches addressing women’s concerns – often labeled the ‘Women in Development’, or WID approach – have assumed a homogenous set of interests and barriers to involvement for women in the development process. This often led to initiatives targeted primarily at women or special women’s initiatives tacked onto larger development programs (Rathgeber 1990). As a critique of WID, the ‘Gender and Development’ or GAD approach emerged with a focus on gender as a set of socially constructed power relations rather than on a narrow set of women’s interests/initiatives. This shift required aid interventions aim at fundamentally altering power imbalances in society and taking seriously the question of men’s gender and masculinities (Cornwall 1997; Cleaver 2003). Despite this theoretical evolution, donors have had trouble escaping older WID approaches to the detriment of strongly implemented GAD programming and policy (Rathgeber 1990, 1995; Tiessen 2007).
resolutions addressing issues linked to gendered impacts of conflict and insecurity. The most notable is Resolution 1820 from 2008, which addressed the issue of sexual violence in armed conflict (United Nations 2008).

Donor efforts to foster peace and security through development assistance by reforming security sectors or support to peacebuilding efforts should reflect gender equality concerns as a result of mainstreaming (Kunz 2014). The influence of global norms of gender and development, as well as an established international discourses on women and security, have spurred calls for approaches to security-related development assistance that addresses gender concerns (Kunz 2014). This is the premise this chapter examines: How much space for gender equality is there within the security and development agenda?

Earlier research has established several ways in which gender concerns might be reflected in security-related development assistance (Kunz 2014). Two complementary approaches are outlined in an instrument called the Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, prepared through a collaboration of several international institutions (Valasek 2008): (1) gender-mainstreamed policy and programming; and (2) policy and programming that promotes the equal participation of men and women. In addition to these two approaches, I would add a third category: (3) policy and programming targeted at promoting gender equity measures. I will briefly discuss each approach in turn.

Gender Mainstreaming: Security-related development assistance where gender is mainstreamed should look like any other form of aid with a gender mainstreaming approach (Kunz 2014). First, the policy or program should make a purposeful assessment of gender implications of the initiative. Second, the initiative should incorporate some means of mitigating any marginalization of specific groups as a result of those gendered outcomes. An example of this can be seen in a policy from the Swedish government’s development agency, Sida, “Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation,” throughout which gender is referred to as a key concern and the value of promoting gender equality as a means of combating violent conflict is noted in a special appendix on promoting structural stability (Sida 2005b).

Equal Participation: The Gender and SSR Toolkit referred to earlier outlines a second approach: that of attempting to ensure equal participation of men and women in SSR interventions. This focus of equal treatment and access to the benefits of development is laudable, but it is unclear how directly equal numbers of men and women participating in a program will lead to change in the socially constructed gender power relations in society. In this respect, it is important to consider a third approach.

Equity Measures: Rather than solely focusing on equal participation, efforts to promote gender equality through development assistance programming may require targeted efforts to use equity measures as means of promoting equality. This requires the deliberately unequal treatment of certain groups to favour previously disadvantaged groups. An example of this might be the need to target interventions to help enable women to engage on a more equal footing with men in an initiative. In this respect, equity can be seen as a necessary precursor to the ability to achieve the equality laid out in the second approach above.

To evaluate the space for gender equality in the security and development agenda of bilateral aid donors, we need to assess donors against the three approaches outlined above. The remainder of this chapter examines the extent to which these approaches have been adopted by three donors, Canada, Sweden, and the United States.
Insights From Three Donors

This section examines the nature of the integration of gender into the security-related development assistance of three bilateral aid agencies: the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Sweden’s Sida, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). I draw upon analysis of policy documents, as well as interview data collected between 2006 and 2008 for a three-country comparative study. I select these three donors for several reasons: (1) they have all begun to engage in some form of security-related development assistance; (2) they represent a diversity of donors in terms of their levels of generosity and their perceived motivations for provision of aid; and (3) they have a varied history in their integration of women and gender issues into their policies and programming.

In the three synopses that follow I provide a snapshot of each donor and their respective successes or failures with integrating gender into their security and development policy and related programming. Each donor has adopted a common approach to security concerns based on the global security and development agenda, though the nature and degree of the implementation of this agenda has varied in each case (Swiss 2011). Each donor country has also engaged in recent military missions in developing countries, providing firsthand experience of the links between insecurity and underdevelopment. In this respect, it is understandable that, like their implementation of the security and development agenda, there has also been significant variation in their integration of gender concerns into their approaches to security. I will explain the variability of these outcomes in the final section of the chapter.

Canada – The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

Canada first grappled simultaneously with the issues of security and development in the mid-1990s. The integration of the human security concept into Canadian foreign policy in this period translated into a new focus at CIDA on aspects of peace and conflict. The most concrete manifestation of this was through the formation of CIDA’s Peacebuilding Unit in 1997 as a funding mechanism allocating Cdn$10 million annually to peace and conflict issues (Thibault 2003). This peacebuilding initiative was part of a broader Canadian government approach to peacebuilding; however, it never translated into a corporate-level policy at CIDA. Indeed, aside from the Peacebuilding fund and unit, the treatment of conflict, security and development at CIDA remained informal and lacked strategic direction. Up until its dissolution and merger into the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development in 2013, CIDA still had no overarching corporate policy or strategy for security and development.

Instead of being linked to a strategic policy on security and development, CIDA’s programming in this area emerged in an ad hoc fashion from its support to countries experiencing or transitioning from conflict. This approach led to security-related assistance in initiatives in the early-2000s in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti, but less focus on security in countries with no immediate foreign policy-related security motive. In the absence of a corporate

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4 The case studies were conducted as a piece of my larger dissertation project which examined the convergence of bilateral aid policies around two issues: gender and security. This chapter thus examines the overlap between these two areas using data collected for the larger project. See Swiss 2009 for more details. CIDA was merged into Canada’s new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development in 2013; however, the conclusions presented here remain relevant to the Canadian context.

5 All three countries have, for instance, contributed forces to the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan.
policy on security and development, this patchwork approach to security-related development emerged in its place.

This is not to imply that CIDA did not undertake security-related programming. Indeed, there were significant investments in police training, DDR programming, and other forms of security assistance. Within the Canadian context, however, a decision in 2005 to form a task force dedicated to security, conflict, and development within Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) meant that the priority accorded to security issues at CIDA remained peripheral. For instance, of the approximately Cdn$187 million of Canadian ODA disbursed in the 2008-2009 fiscal year coded under the “Conflict, Peace, and Security” category, CIDA was responsible for only Cdn$44.4 million or 23.75% (CIDA 2010). The remaining Cdn$142.6 million was delivered by ‘Other Government Departments’ at the time, mainly DFAIT. In the 2011-2012 fiscal year, this gap had widened with CIDA delivering only $21.3 million of a total $257 million in aid to this sector, while DFAIT disbursed $202 million (CIDA 2013).

Due to data limitations it is difficult to aggregate data on what proportion of conflict and security related aid has a gender focus within Canadian aid. The best measure available comes from the OECD DAC, which has tracked what proportion of sector allocable ODA commitments Canada made to fragile or conflict-affected6 states is gender focused (OECD 2010b). In 2007-2008, the total amount of gender-focused commitments was US$307 million, with US$25 million having gender as the principal objective and the remainder including gender as a significant objective. This accounted for 41% of all sector allocable commitments Canada made to fragile and conflict-affected states. Unfortunately, it is impossible to discern from the DAC data what proportion of the US$307 million was allocated to peace and security programming. By 2012-2013, the share of Canadian aid to fragile states with gender as principal objective had grown to 43%, but again the portion of this which was attributable expressly to peace and security was unclear (OECD 2015).

With less than half of its aid commitments to fragile and conflict-affected states linked to gender as a principal objective, the extent to which Canada in this period incorporated any of the three gender approaches into its security-related assistance was – like its entire approach to security issues – ad hoc and patchwork. The absence of an overarching strategy for security and development meant there was no policy into which gender could be mainstreamed. As such, policy from above did not promote the creation of programming either targeting equal participation of women and men, or supporting gender equity measures in the security context. This lack of a corporate-level strategy on security acted as a barrier to overall policy coherence within the agency.

One might be tempted to point at CIDA’s long history of support to gender equality as a contributor to the possible integration of gender into its security-related work. However, neither of CIDA’s 1999 policy on gender nor its 2010 successor was paid significant attention to security issues, and the overall policy vacuum at CIDA did little to enhance the integration of the two concerns. Furthermore, evidence points towards a declining level of priority accorded to gender issues in Canada’s aid program (Plewes and Kerr 2010; Tiessen 2014, 2015; Tiessen and Carrier 2015).

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6 The OECD definition of “fragile and conflict-affected” is not listed in this document, which instead lists forty-three countries which they treat as falling into this category but which is clearly identified as “not an official OECD list of fragile and conflict-affected states” (OECD 2010b: 3).
In the absence of a concrete integration of gender and security in CIDA programs, the former DFAIT’s programming from 2006-2014 under its Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) and Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) demonstrated the most overt commitment to the gender and security issues in the Canadian context. START and the GPSF-funded some security-related initiatives addressing women and security, but some of these programs would not qualify as ODA if they involve military aid, certain types of support to policing, or counter-terrorism activities.

Some Canadian civil society groups have actively advocated on behalf of the integration of these two concerns. The most active on this front has been the former Canadian Peacebuilding Coordination Committee (now Peacebuild) and its Women, Peace, and Security caucus/gender and peacebuilding network. This group actively promoted Canada’s uptake and implementation of the UN’s Resolution 1325 and advocated for a closer linking of gender and security concerns in Canadian policy and programs.

From a broader Canadian government perspective, this civil society advocacy paid off in October 2010 when the Government of Canada announced an action plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325. This plan was managed by the former DFAIT and reported upon by all related government departments (Tiessen 2015). CIDA was involved in this respect, but the details of how gender and security were to be linked in its programming as a result were unclear and ahead of its dissolution CIDA showed no indication of making changes to its policy and programming environment as a result of the action plan. With the merger of the two departments in 2013, the policy vacuum that had existed on these issues previously at CIDA may be in the process of shifting towards an era of greater policy direction and coherence, but it remains unclear whether this shift has yet occurred.

**Sweden – The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)**

Sida first adopted a policy on peace and security in 1999. This initial policy focused primarily on adopting a ‘do no harm’ approach and, according to one Sida official, gained little widespread acceptance within the agency. In 2003, Sweden created a government-wide policy on development issues: the Policy for Global Development (PGD) (Sweden 2003). It highlighted security as a central theme and subsequently, in 2005, Sida established a Division for Peace and Security in Development Cooperation. The creation of this specialized division was followed with the release of a more comprehensive policy entitled “Promoting Peace and Security Through Development Cooperation” (Sida 2005b). Through this policy, Sida intended to mainstream conflict analysis in its development programming. This mainstreaming effort appears to have worked, as approximately 20 percent of Sida funding had peace and security mainstreamed as its main or secondary target in 2008 (Sida 2011). Likewise, Sida dedicated 3% of its overall budget to programming specifically in the peace and security sector (Sida 2011). The 2005 policy framework has translated into resources mobilized to support programming in this sector.

Gender featured prominently in the 2005 peace and security policy statement. Adopting a rights-based framework to link poverty, peace, and security, the policy highlights the importance of gender:

Application of this framework assures attention to essential values and norms such as participation, transparency, accountability, equality in dignity and the rights of all
women, men, girls and boys. During violent conflict or high levels of insecurity, many of these rights are limited or denied (Sida 2005b: 6).

Likewise, in the 2005 Sida gender policy, the need to integrate gender into programming related to conflict and stability was noted:

In promoting structural stability and in conflict management, Sida will address the specific needs and interests of women and men, girls and boys – for example, by strengthening women’s participation in peace processes or by promoting changes to societal norms on gender-based violence (Sida 2005a: 9).

The pairing of these two policies underscores the higher level of policy coherence and coordination within the Swedish context when it comes to gender issues. Indeed, this coordination goes beyond complementary policy statements to extend to implementation of the same. For instance, a 2010 evaluation of Sida’s work on gender equality found that Sida’s gender unit played a critical leadership role in pushing Sida’s Conflict and Post-Conflict Cooperation Department to undertake an exercise in devising new approaches to combat gender-based violence (Byron and Örnemark 2010).

DAC data on gender programming in fragile and conflicted-affected states in 2007-2008 showed that Sweden committed US$225 million to gender-focused aid in fragile and conflict-affected states (OECD 2010b). In contrast to Canada, Sweden has both a greater proportion of its gender-focused aid commitments that have gender as a principal focus (24% vs. Canada’s 8%), and a greater proportion of its sector allocable aid that is gender focused (75% vs. Canada’s 41%). These figures reflect, perhaps, the greater coherence and prioritization of gender in Swedish policy and its link to increased gender-focused programming in the Swedish case.

Despite this more intensive focus on gender in its aid allocations, concerns about the use of aid monies for possible military purposes have been a major preoccupation of Swedish civil society when assessing what Sweden should do in the area of security and development, particularly given the expression of interest by the Swedish military to access aid funds for use in peace missions abroad (Thorsell and Weber 2006). At the same time, Swedish civil society has been very active in promoting Sida’s implementation of gender policies and programs (Swiss 2009). This strong influence by civil society, when combined with overall policy coherence between the security and gender policies, allows for greater space in the Swedish aid system for gender to be addressed in their policy and programs linked to the security-development agenda. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the gender-integrated peacebuilding interventions supported by Sida are implemented by Swedish civil society. For instance, community engagement centres run by the Swedish civil society group Diakonia helped promote peace and conflict prevention in Iraq and support women’s and children’s rights (Sida 2011).

On the whole, Sida’s efforts to integrate a gender perspective in its policy and programming on conflict and security upheld the organization’s broader reputation as a leader on gender issues globally. In this respect the extent of gender integration reflects a high level of policy coherence within the agency and more broadly within Sweden’s approach to development.

*United States – The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)*
The American approach to integrating security in its development assistance has been marked by a close working relationship between USAID and the State Department. This in turn reflects the reputation for American aid being closely aligned to the country’s foreign policy and commercial interests (Lancaster 2007; Lancaster 2008; Swiss 2011). Given these motivations for aid and the close ties between USAID and the State Department, the subsequent close links between security and development in American aid policy is not surprising.

In this respect, USAID can be considered a policy receiver rather than a policy creator like the State Department. This is not surprising given the large amount of other aid flows the US provides in the military and defense sectors that do not qualify as ODA, an amount that totaled approximately US$16.8 billion in 2006 (USAID 2007). Indeed, USAID’s primary ODA recipients in this period closely mirrored the top recipients of American military and defense assistance: In 2005, the top three recipients were Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel.

In 2002, USAID released the policy statement *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*, which made conflict issues a prominent focus of American aid (USAID 2002). This approach to conflict at USAID was further refined in 2005 with the creation of the USAID policy on Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) which, aside from creating a unit within the agency to address CMM, also attempted to mainstream conflict analysis into USAID programming (USAID 2005). This policy document mentions only the concept of gender in the context of the changing face of conflict. It states that the “role of women” – among other cross-cutting issues – has an impact on the sources of violent conflict, but does not go so far as to integrate a gender lens within the conflict mainstreaming process.

Despite this limited treatment of women and gender in the CMM documents, a 2006 report by USAID’s Office of Women in Development highlights several aspects of USAID’s work with women that are linked to security issues (USAID 2006). The report *Women, Men, and Development* briefly summarizes US aid to fight problems like trafficking and violence against women (VAW) as key features of the agency’s work on WID. Additionally, the report highlights what it sees as challenges to USAID’s future work in this area, showcasing both VAW and the gendered impact of conflict as key challenges (USAID 2006: 24). The level of integration of women’s issues and security issues in this document suggests latitude within USAID policy frameworks for the confluence of the two issues.

Likewise, in 2007, a joint strategic plan for USAID and the State Department updated the agency’s approach to security and conflict as a part of the overall five-year strategic direction for US foreign policy (USAID and State Department 2007). This document twice mentions gender-based violence as government concern and highlights a focus on the ‘protection’ of women and children in American humanitarian aid. It includes other references to women, but not in the context of security-related concerns. Though not as effective an effort to integrate gender into the two agencies’ security approach.

In contrast, two 2009 USAID policy documents on its work on issues of conflict and security, were nearly silent on gender issues. First, USAID joined with the State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD) to prepare a set of shared guidelines for SSR (USAID 2009a). These guidelines were intended to help practitioners from all three organizations with “planning and implementing Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs with foreign partner nations” (USAID 2009a, 1); however, USAID provided no mention of gender or women in the entire document. Silence on these issues was symptomatic of the limited treatment of gender within the American security-related aid context.
The second document from 2009 was a toolkit prepared by the CMM group to outline USAID’s involvement in supporting peace processes (USAID 2009b). The integration of gender analysis in this document was not entirely absent like in the SSR guidelines, but consisted only of two brief mentions of the potential to work with women’s organizations in peace processes because of their potential role to form bridges between groups in conflict. This is a laudable approach, but given the much broader implications of peace processes for women and the gendered impact of post-conflict peacebuilding, the integration of gender into this aspect of USAID’s security-related aid is insufficient to make any substantive impact on gender relations (Kunz 2014).

The extent to which gender was integrated into American security-related aid policy and programming has been mixed and in the late 2000s appeared quite limited. Indeed, when trying to compare the proportion of American aid allocated to gender focused programming in fragile and conflict-affected states, the OECD DAC’s data reflects this same silence. In contrast to Canada and Sweden, and indeed in contrast to all of the other DAC member states, the US was the only DAC state not to screen its aid commitments for a gender focus, leaving us unable to discern what proportion of the purported US$9.4 billion it spent in fragile states in 2007-2008 was focused on gender (OECD 2010b).

This silence on gender within US development assistance is perhaps understandable, as USAID was one of the few major bilateral aid agencies in the world that had not shifted its approach to addressing issues of women and gender to a fully ‘gender’ focused approach. The long persistence of the Office of Women in Development suggests that the approach to dealing with gender issues at USAID had trouble escaping from earlier WID discourses in development thought (Swiss 2009). It was only in mid-2011 that USAID finally renamed the WID Office the ‘Office of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment’ to reflect a shift towards a gender-focused approach within the agency, and the increased focus on women and gender issues the agency experienced following the appointment of Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State in early 2009. Subsequent to these changes, the CMM group at USAID has also been conducting a gender and security speaker series which has brought top academics in the gender and security field to the agency to share their ideas. Whether this change in approach to gender leads to significant change in American security-related aid remains to be seen.

**Factors Influencing Divergent Outcomes**

We see in Canada, Sweden, and the United States three relatively similar approaches to security and development issues, but divergent efforts to integrate gender into their respective security and development agendas. Sweden is most successful at incorporating gender into its approach to conflict, security and development. At the same time, the United States has had mixed success in integrating these two cross-cutting concerns. Finally, the Canadian case points to a near vacuum in the treatment of these issues in the former-CIDA’s policy context and subsequently in programming. In an effort to account for these divergent outcomes, I will turn now to an analysis that attempts to explain these divergent outcomes, despite similar approaches to security in these donors’ aid policy. Based on analysis of each donors’ policy documents and reports, as well as a series of interviews conducted with aid officials, NGO representatives, and others working in the aid sector in each country between 2006 and 2008, I identify three factors which shaped the
extent of gender integration in each case: (1) policy coherence; (2) resource mobilization; and (3) civil society’s influence on donor policy.

Policy Coherence

Policy coherence played a strong role in shaping the space for gender in the security-development agenda of these three donor countries. The alignment of their aid policies with their respective diplomatic and defense policies is crucial in this regard, but coherence of policy within donor agencies is also an important factor. Sida and USAID had a fairly consistent set of policies which aligned donor agency approaches to the broader objectives of their state. Both countries’ aid agencies are very closely tied to their respective ministries of foreign affairs/state (Swiss 2011). Interestingly, however, this leads to two divergent outcomes. Sida integrates gender into its conflict and security policy in a different fashion than does USAID. This could be due to Sweden’s much fuller integration of gender concerns in state structures and policy generally. Indeed, Sweden is often characterized as a gender egalitarian state (Towns 2002). In this way, where we see policy coherence in Sweden, it is coherence within the context of egalitarianism.

In the American case, where we see a mixed level of integration of women and gender into security-related aid, it appears to be expressly in those instances where policies are most closely aligned with the State Department or DOD when space for gender is diminished. In policies and reports by USAID independent of other actors, women and gender concerns are given more attention. In contrast to Sweden, this would reflect the diminished priority placed on women and gender issues by the broader policy context in the US, something that has been shown previously to influence the extent to which gender issues have found purchase at USAID (Swiss 2009). One interview respondent from USAID reflects this when she suggests that security always trumps development when the competing interests of USAID, the State Department, and DOD are considered: “I guess national security interest always wins” (27 March 2007).

In the Canadian case, CIDA’s lack of a corporate policy on security and development led to a reduced degree of policy coherence between aid, diplomacy, and defense. This absence enabled CIDA to take an ad hoc approach on security generally, and left little overall guidance for the agency in terms of its application of the security-development agenda vis-à-vis Canadian foreign and defense policy generally. In addition, the former DFAIT had been made responsible for delivering a significant proportion of Canada’s security-related aid and CIDA was left dealing with security-related assistance on a case-by-case basis in countries with clear conflict and post-conflict factors at play. This is not to imply that CIDA did not cooperate closely with other Canadian government actors in the delivery of aid in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, or Sudan. Indeed, CIDA’s participation in the Kandahar PRT was indicative of this approach (see Brown, this volume). My argument here is that in the absence of policy at CIDA that was coherent with the rest of the Canadian government, or which linked Canada’s security-related aid to its gender policy, it is not surprising that the integration of the two was lacking. The fact that from 2006 on we have seen a diminishing level of priority attached to the issue of gender equality at CIDA and now at DFATD (Tiessen 2014, 2015) also contributed to this lack of integration. The 2010 update to CIDA’s 1999 gender policy could have included a more serious and strategic treatment of conflict and security issues and helped promote more coherence between the two crosscutting issues in CIDA’s policy and programming. However, as mentioned earlier, the
updated “Gender Equality Policy and Tools” document contained no mention of security, conflict, or state fragility and was indeed silent on the issue of security and development altogether.

The degree of policy coherence both within aid agencies and inter-departmentally within governments thus plays a diverse role in explaining the divergent outcomes for making space for gender in the respective donors’ security and development agendas. Higher levels of coherence in the Swedish and American cases lead to disparate outcomes because of the differing placement of gender within the overall policy context of each country. The lack of policy coherence in the Canadian case is a root cause of the lack of solid integration of gender into Canadian approaches to security and development.

**Mobilizing Resources**

A recurrent theme that emerged in my discussions with aid officials in all three countries was the lack of resources. This was a common refrain in the context of gender equality, but it also surprisingly emerged in the case of security-related aid. One Canadian aid official characterized the situation regarding how conflict analysis had been integrated within CIDA country programs as being “too much butter spread over too little bread in terms of people [being] busy trying to do project-level management and accountability things and too little effort is spent on the analysis needed to have a strategic view of where we’re headed” (6 February 2007). An American aid official echoed this notion of resource constraints by suggesting there was a lack of funding for security issues, but that this shortage was typical of all crosscutting issues in the agency (29 March 2007). The lack of resources and time to properly conduct conflict analysis mirrored similar resource constraints for gender concerns. A Sida official highlighted similar perceptions about resource constraints in the gender case:

> We have two gender advisors at the whole of Sida. Which includes around 850 people, including the embassies and the development corporation sections. That means that if everybody would be interested, and working with gender and would need the advice; I mean it’s an equation that just would not work. […] So what we are all trying to do with these two people, is of course to do as much as we can. But we are completely overworked. And the tragedy in this is that when people actually ask us to do something, we quite often have to say no. Which does not promote gender. Because then […] the program officers say ‘Well, we ask you and you can’t do it anyway, so why bother?’ (12 September 2006)

The fact that stretched resources – both human and financial – are raised by experts from both sides of the gender and security nexus speaks to a common problem among all three donors. Even though we see a divergent integration of gender issues in the security and development policy of each donor, all three are challenged by this context of limited resources. Both security and gender experts agree that if there were more resources they could better implement policy and programming in its most desirable form: more security programming could be undertaken, better conflict analysis would be carried out, gender would be mainstreamed more effectively. Taken together, these resource constraints suggest that reduced ability to act on either issue separately should equally be considered a constraint to integrate gender and security issues. Whether limited numbers of gender experts in the Sida case, the inability to mainstream conflict
analysis in the Canadian case, or a limited set of resources for conflict programming in USAID, all these constraints can be seen to act as barriers to the integration of gender in the security-related assistance of each donor.

The solutions to this situation reflect a need for not only more financial and human resources, but also for political will or a certain institutional influence behind individuals working on these issues. One USAID official characterized this in the context of gender issues by saying:

[T]here really is a commitment […] to move this area forward in understanding that it is more likely to happen if you have a dedicated gender advisor and if you give that champion seed money essentially (12 November 2007).

A gender champion has been found in other research to be a key factor accounting for increased integration of gender into development programming and policy (Moser 2005; Moser and Moser 2005; Swiss 2009). In the case of integrating gender into security-related programming and policy, none of the donors has a champion dedicated to precisely these issues. The presence of a gender champion alone could be enough to contribute to greater integration, but a specific individual responsible for championing the integration of gender concerns into security programming might yield even greater effect. Such champions can mobilize resources and help aid agencies make their security-related, and indeed all, programming and policy more attentive of gendered impacts and concerns. Beyond relying on the leadership of champions, if we hope to see greater progress towards adopting gender-integrated approaches to security aid, we would hope to see concurrent increases in resources for both gender and security issues. This will enable the points at which confluences emerge between the two areas to be prioritized rather than marginalized because of resource constraint.

Civil Society Influence on Donor Policy

The final consideration that emerged in my interviews with aid officials surrounded the extent to which aid agencies had ties to and were influenced by civil society groups in their respective countries. Earlier research has shown that the extent to which aid agencies are more closely tied to civil society strongly influences their degree of uptake of policy priorities favored by such groups and society more broadly (Swiss 2009). In this respect, civil society groups often reflect the broader social attitudes of a donor country’s inhabitants. A country more generally supportive of gender equality, like Sweden, is more likely to have civil society urging its donor agency to adopt and implement gender equality norms. Within the case of gender equality in these three donors, ties to civil society appear to play a significant role in holding donors accountable for gender equality concerns.

The same cannot be said for civil society influence over donor security policy and programming. Across the three cases, representatives of civil society and aid officials frequently referred to the majority of civil society expressing disapproval and advocacy against security or conflict-related aid. One CIDA official stated that civil society was very concerned about what would qualify as ODA within a new securitized framework: “They were really coming at us when it came down to the ODA eligibility stuff. They really came after us” (6 February 2007). Likewise, when asked how much influence civil society had over the adoption of security and development related policies, another former CIDA official reported:
There was some. There was quite a debate in Canada within the development community about the extent to which CIDA was supporting the use of ODA for conflict-related issues. There was a divergence within that community. There was some who supported it and some who were strongly against it. The more traditional development agencies were saying, ‘This is at odds with the criteria and the concept and the raison d’être of ODA.’ And others were saying, “The world is changing and Canada needs to be there.” So, we were involved in that. We consulted with stakeholders in Canada. I met fairly regularly with the CCIC [Canadian Council for International Co-operation] and others. (30 January 2007)

Other officials claimed that civil society had been rather quiet on security issues. One USAID official reflected upon civil society advocacy on security aid by saying: “I haven’t seen it if there is. There may well be and they certainly are lobbying on many other issues. But this tends not to be a core competence of most civil society groups, so they haven’t – at least in the US – they have not been particularly vocal about it” (27 March 2007).

Civil society attempts to influence on donors to resist the securitization of aid varied in all three countries; however, each donor, in its own way, had made progress towards more closely linking security and development in its aid programming and policy. Civil society’s influence on donor integration of gender into the security-development agenda was thus related mostly to the amount of influence civil society groups had over gender policies within the respective countries.

In this respect, it was not surprising to see Sida and USAID achieve more towards integrating gender issues into their security-related aid policy and programming. In both cases, the influence of civil society on the integration of gender within their respective aid programs is much stronger than in Canada. Indeed, one CIDA gender expert argued that most advocacy from civil society on gender was limited and originated from CIDA urging Canadian NGOs to adopt positions on gender equality, rather than the other way around (4 October 2006).

Despite this, another CIDA official did report that the gender and peacebuilding group of what is now Peacebuild Canada was actively involved in trying to influence the Canadian government’s plan to implement Resolution 1325 (13 February 2007). This action plan appears not to have translated strongly into either CIDA policy or programming. In this respect, when it is a single organization attempting to influence a donor, and the donor agency lacks commitment to implementing the plan, the extent to which gender is integrated into the security and development agenda is equally limited.

Conclusion

I argue here that the combination of three key factors – policy coherence, resource mobilization, and civil society influence – helped account for the divergent degree of gender integration seen in the security-related policy and programming of the three bilateral donors. It is clear from these brief case studies and preliminary analysis that the advent of the security and development agenda is still fresh within these agencies and as a result all three have progress to make in terms of how gender is integrated into their work if they are to respect the international commitments they have made in this area. Though based on results from an examination of only three DAC
donors, I argue that the same factors can be expected to play a role among any of the DAC donors. Without policy coherence, sufficient resource mobilization, and some degree of civil society influence, it is difficult to imagine donors opening space for gender in their approaches to security and development.

Of the three donors considered, Sida is most advanced in its treatment of security and gender as a result of its more coherent policy, more active civil society engagement, and greater dedicated resources. USAID shows how competing motivations lead to a mixed application of gender issues in its security related work. When led by the aid agency itself, women’s issues appear more central to its security and conflict policy. However, when aid programming is integrated into the broader security and development objectives of the State Department or DOD, these gender concerns seem to fall by the wayside. Inter-departmental policy coherence in this context appears to play into the hands of security concerns only. Finally, CIDA seems to trail both Sida and USAID in its integration of these issues into policy and programming. Much of this stems from the lack of a CIDA corporate policy on security issues. With the Canadian action plan on resolution 1325 in place and Canada’s strong track record on gender and foreign aid, CIDA has the potential for future security and development policy to account more fully for these factors. CIDA’s policy environment, however, has stagnated in recent years.

By making policy coherent across government and within aid agencies, by mobilizing resources for gender, security, and specifically for their integration, and by being open to civil society’s concerns about the place of women and gender in the security and development agenda, all donors have the potential to follow Sida’s lead and work towards a fuller integration of gender in their security-related policy and work. Although I have argued elsewhere that the securitization of aid has the potential to limit donor attention paid to gender issues (Swiss 2012b), the securitization of aid would also appear to open new windows for the integration of gender into aid policy and programming. Indeed, there is a potential for significant space for gender in the security and development agenda if other donors follow the Swedish lead. In this respect, the securitization of aid may provide a new entry point for donor action on gender (Kunz 2014). To be sure, donor political will, in combination with the three factors I outline above, is necessary to enable that space to expand.

References


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