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Gendered Leadership: The Effects of Female Development Agency Leaders on Foreign Aid Spending[1]

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This article examines the effects of gender on the leadership of bilateral development aid agencies, particularly their official development assistance (ODA) allocations toward gender-related programming. Drawing on earlier research on gendered leadership, the article tests the hypothesis that female director generals (DGs) and ministers responsible for aid agencies will allocate more ODA than their male counterparts toward gender programming. This existing literature on gendered leadership is divided: some scholars argue that women and men have distinct leadership styles on account of their gender, while others argue that the only distinguishing factor is the institutional context in which they lead. Drawing on data collected on aid flows and agency leadership within the major Western aid donors of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) over the period from 1995 through 2009, we use pooled time series analysis to examine the effects of gendered leadership on aid allocation. Our analysis reveals a tendency for female DGs and ministers to focus ODA on gender-mainstreaming programs, while male DGs focus ODA on gender-focused programs. We argue that these divergent priorities reflect the women's desire to reform gendered power structures within their respective aid agencies, and the men's desire to maintain existing gender power structures from which they benefit.

KEY WORDS: donor agencies; economic sociology; foreign aid; gender; leadership; mainstreaming.

INTRODUCTION

On July 5, 2011, Christine Lagarde became the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) first female managing director in the organization's 66-year history. Unfortunately, Lagarde's experience is uncommon, as men are still far more likely than women to occupy top positions in corporations, governments, agencies, and organizations. Furthermore, when women do manage to break through this "glass ceiling," it is often as "tokens" to be "treated as representatives of their category, as symbols rather than individuals" (Kanter 1977:966). In this position as a small minority, women often feel uncomfortable doing or saying anything that may impose on the dominant male culture (Kanter 1977). Lagarde, however, has stated her desire to address the IMF's infamous lack of gender diversity—an action that calls to mind the debate over gendered leadership.

Gendered leadership refers to the effect gender has on leadership styles, that is, the notion that women lead differently than men. Some scholars argue that women

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employ a more feminine leadership style than men that involves giving greater attention to women's issues (Childs 2002; Rule and Hill 1996; Thomas and Welch 2001; Wahl 2010) and creating a less hierarchical, more participatory work environment (Rosener 1997; Thiruvadi 2012). Other scholars contend that gender is unimportant when it comes to a leader's style—that what matters is the institutional context in which they lead (Childs and Krook 2009; Dym and Hutson 2005; Eagly and Carli 2003).

This debate is as relevant today as it has ever been. After women gained access to paid employment in the post–World War II era, feminists slowly realized that women were still not equal to their male coworkers—women's representation in senior management positions "did not mirror their 50 per cent composition of the total US workforce" (Kiaye and Singh 2013:29). This realization led to the creation of the U.S. Federal Glass Ceiling Commission (GCC) in 1991, which sought to determine how to eliminate the barriers preventing women from reaching senior management positions (Singh 2013). Soon after this, in 1995, the United Nations Development Programme introduced the gender empowerment measure (GEM), now in use in 108 countries (Ismail, Rasdi, and Jamal 2011). GEM accounts for, among other things, the proportion of seats held by women in Parliament and the proportion of women administrators and managers (Ismail, Rasdi, and Jamal 2011). Then there are countries like Malaysia, which in 2004 and 2011 established two separate policies allocating 30% of the decision-making positions in the public and private sector, respectively, to women (Ahmad-Zaluki and Nurwati 2012); and Rwanda, which, with the help of quotas for women in Parliament, has gone from being the site of the world's worst genocide in history to being the country with the world's highest percentage of female parliamentarians in roughly 15 years (Hogg 2009).

Of course, the primary motive for getting more women into leadership positions should be simply that it is the right thing to do—women have every right that men do to be leaders. But beyond this human rights argument, scholars also make more functional arguments for eliminating gender inequality in leadership positions. Ismail, Rasdi, and Jamal (2011), for instance, point out that by maintaining a paucity of female leaders many countries are failing to maximize their economic potential. Other research shows that there is a relationship between the number of women on a corporate board and that board's focus on charitable contributions, employee benefits, and community engagement (Bernardi and Threadgill 2010). Women can also enhance corporate boards because they "provide unique perspectives, experiences, and work styles as compared to their male counterparts" (Daily and Dalton 2003). Burke (1997) and Bilimoria (2000) also suggest that companies' decision making can benefit from having women directors.

So, in light of Christine Lagarde's decision to address the gender inequality at the IMF, we ask a related question in this article: *Does a development organization's allocation of funding to issues of gender equality depend on the gender*[4] *of the director general and/or minister?* This is an important question

[4] For the sake of simplicity to operationalize our leadership variable, we use gender here synonymously with sex, fully aware of the problems associated with conflating the two concepts that are widely acknowledged in the social sciences literature on sex and gender.

beyond the international discussion on gender leadership. Women in the developing world face notoriously harsh economic, social, and general living conditions—much harsher than those of the men living in the same area (ICRW 2009; Nanda, Switlick, and Lule 2005:4; UNESCO 2008). Because of this pervasive gender inequality, it is necessary to investigate any possibility that female director generals[5] (DGs) and ministers make spending decisions that benefit women in the developing world.

Our analysis focuses on a sample of 23 bilateral aid agencies that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC). Bilateral aid agencies are institutions established by a national government and act as the mechanism for allocating foreign aid to developing countries. These agencies are funded primarily through tax dollars and operate under the authority of the DG, who takes direction from the minister of foreign affairs/development cooperation. Our research first determines which agencies, from the period of 1995–2009, had female DGs/ministers and whether this influenced how much official development assistance (ODA)[6] they allocated to gender policy and programs in general, and which sorts of gender programs in particular. We include in this analysis the ministers responsible for their respective development agency because DGs often must approve any ODA allocation with the minister and follow ministerial direction on which sectors to focus ODA allocation. As such, ministers and DGs have interrelated influence over ODA allocation.

While this research is only exploratory, it does stand as a contribution to the literature on leadership and development studies. It is our hope that this work will guide later qualitative research looking to understand the topic further and hopefully culminate in policy recommendations.

CONTEXT AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

While there is a sizable body of literature on the effects of gendered leadership in legislatures and the public/private sector, its effects on development agencies have not been adequately studied. This is a significant oversight given that such leadership may have a substantial impact on the way that billions of dollars in ODA is distributed annually. To start, we first review the history and scholarship surrounding development aid as a concept, along with the progress toward incorporation of women and gender equality within the development project. We then examine the literature on gendered organizational culture, men and women in the workplace, and gendered leadership. This literature provides the foundation for our analysis.

[5] Throughout this article we will use *director general* synonymously with agency head or CEO as this is the terminology used by the majority of the bilateral aid agencies of the industrialized Western democracies.

[6] ODA refers to development assistance funds provided by donor governments on concessional terms either below market rates of interest or in the form of no-interest grants.

Focus to Mainstream: The Development Project, Women, and Gender

The process of international development has evolved over several decades, and its treatment of women and issues of gender has evolved along with it. Prior to 1970, when Ester Boserup published *Women's Role in Economic Development*, scholars and development policy makers assumed that both men and women would benefit equally from development policy (Razavi and Miller 1995). Since the 1970s, acknowledging women and their distinct burdens has become a primary concern in development policy and scholarship. The first female-oriented model of development, known as women in development (WID), recognized that women were not benefiting from modernization and development the same as men—in some cases women's position and status had actually declined since the official introduction of development policy (Razavi and Miller 1995). The proposed solution was to integrate women into the productive sphere (Tinker 1990). Development agencies began to provide women with access to credit facilities and newly developed technology all in the hope that this would alleviate gender inequality in the developing world (Rathgeber 1990). WID is one example of gender-focused programming: initiatives that target a specific gender (usually women) in an attempt to fit them into the existing socioeconomic structure without questioning the structure itself. Gender-focused programs are somewhat analogous to a doctor who treats his/her patients' symptoms rather than their underlying illnesses.

WID programming was the preferred method of tackling gender inequality until the 1980s when the Gender and Development (GAD) paradigm emerged (Rathgeber 1990). This model expands the focus beyond the productive sector to include women's unequal access to power in all aspects of society and draws attention to the tendency for women's reproductive work to be trivialized (Young 2002). In essence, GAD seeks to understand how gender relations are impacted by development strategies and why women typically get the short end of the stick (Young 2002). Supporters of GAD recommend moving beyond gender-focused programming—women-specific credit systems, affirmative action plans, leadership training for women, and so forth—and instead focus on reexamining the social structures and institutions that perpetuate gender inequality (Rathgeber 1990). Unfortunately, because "[GAD] demands a degree of commitment to structural change and power shifts that is unlikely to be found either in national or in international agencies" (Rathgeber 1990:495) it was confined to the ivory tower, and the development sector continued to pursue band-aid solutions through gender-focused programs (European Commission 2004; Salime 2010).

In fact, it was not until 1995 that the GAD paradigm gained any support in the broader development sector, now in the form of gender mainstreaming. At the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, governments from around the world identified gender mainstreaming—the "integration of gender considerations in all aspects of an organization's work" (Tiessen 2007:17)—as the most important mechanism for achieving gender equality (Moser and Moser 2005). What makes gender mainstreaming so crucial is that it recognizes that gender equality can only be successfully promoted through an organization that is itself egalitarian (Rao and Kelleher 2005; Tiessen 2007). Unlike gender-focused programs, gender mainstreaming promotes equality in recipient communities as well as the gendered development organizations responsible for its initiation. And unlike gender-focused programs, gender mainstreaming advocates a holistic, treat-the-illness approach that involves focusing on the norms and behaviors that perpetuate gender inequality.

Gendered Leadership: Men, Women, and Leaders in the Workplace

When discussing gendered leadership it is tempting to focus exclusively on women—how their often-feminine leadership styles deviate from the norm, the masculine. To some degree this focus makes sense, for only in the last few decades have women begun to attain the positions of power atop the employment hierarchy. Yet there is as much to be learned from studying the norm as there is from studying the deviant, and this means examining men in the workplace.

Acker's (1990) seminal work on the gendered structure of organizations argues that seemingly gender-neutral processes, practices, and policies within an organization actually serve to reproduce the patriarchal global gender order. Crucial to this process of reproduction is that "men are almost always in the highest positions of organizational power," and that once there, "managers' decisions often initiate gender divisions" (Acker 1990:146). Underlying the tendency for men to occupy most positions of organizational power is the fact that most people's "image of the top manager or the business leader is an image of successful, forceful masculinity (Acker 1990:146), and of course having a male body is a symbolic asset for those who wish to be categorized as a man (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009). So, by virtue of his male body, a male is better equipped to present a successful, forceful masculinity, which makes him more likely to become manager where he is able to maintain the cycle of masculine privilege.

Beyond leadership positions, employment in general has long been associated with masculinity. The male breadwinner model—in which men work and women care—has been the norm in Western society since the industrial revolution (Crompton 2000). Men receive considerable material and political power as a result of this gender division, and over time the male breadwinner model was normalized as the "right and proper" organization of society (Crompton 2000:2). However, over the last 50 years feminists have been chipping away at the legitimacy of the social norms that exclude women from the labor market (Crompton 2000); as a result, in 2010, women's share of the adult labor force in the Western world was roughly 47% (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2010:78).

Unfortunately, the flood of women into paid work has not been accompanied by a change in gender relations (Crompton 2000), which explains the existence of "men's" and "women's" work—the latter often being undervalued, underpaid, and overrepresented by females (Simpson 2005; Williams 1995). In fact, when men do "women's work," like nursing, teaching, librarianship, and social work, they often perceive a very real threat to their masculinity (Lupton 2000; Williams 1995); conversely, men also feel threatened by women's entry into technical "men's" work (Acker 1990). Research on "men's" and "women's" work therefore indicates that a man's masculinity and concept of self often hinges on their career (Williams 1993) and a continued gender division of labor.

Perhaps, then, is not surprising to see resistance to gender equality among men. Harkening back to Acker (1990), recent research highlights men's efforts to "maintain organizational culture that is heavily masculinized and unwelcoming to women"—efforts that include "active opposition to gender-equality measures or quiet undermining of them" (Connell 2005:1810). Indeed, for male managers, gender equality discourse is at odds with management discourse, which sees "women as deficient, and management as immutable" (Wahl 2010:16). Male managers subtly resist gender equality by using gender equality discourse only when "trying to downplay the importance of gender"—insinuating that gender equality already exists in their organization (Wahl 2010:16). Tiessen's (2007) research within several development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in sub-Saharan Africa also highlights a tendency for male managers and staff to justify their resistance toward gender equality discourse and programming with reference to the supposed gender neutrality of their organization. Tiessen's (2007:29) interviews found evidence of more active opposition to internal gender-equality policy: an enforced gendered division of labor, a consensus among male staff that gender issues are relatively unimportant, and a tendency for male staff to dismiss female colleagues concerned with gender equality as "females complaining."

The workplace is actually a prime site of resistance because it represents what men stand to lose: the patriarchal dividend and their masculine identity (Connell 2005). The patriarchal dividend describes how men benefit—socially, economically, politically, emotionally—from the current patriarchal gender order (Connell 2005). But beyond this, men are clearly afraid of losing their masculinity, which is defined primarily through the breadwinner identity and privileged access to powerful, prestigious, technical positions (Connell 2005; Williams 1995).

Given men's resistance to gender equality and their reasons for doing so, we believe male development organization DGs/ministers will be resistant to gender mainstreaming as well. Gender mainstreaming is about bringing gender equality to the mainstream: "where choices are considered and decisions are made that effect economic, social and political options.... The mainstream determines who gets what and provides a rationale for the allocation of resources and opportunities" (European Commission 2004:10). Even this relatively harmless definition—which makes no explicit mention of an examination and restructuring of the gender relations within the organization—presents a threat to all male staff for whom a separation of "petty" gender issues from "real" development issues is important. Then there are the development organizations whose definition of gender mainstreaming contains clear mention of an effort to include gender equality in administration, financing, staffing, and so forth, or to grant female employees a stronger voice and greater decision-making power—all with the stated goal of changing the culture of the organization (Moser and Moser 2005). Research documenting the gendered culture of development organizations around the world (Hendricks 2005; Moser and Moser 2005; Tiessen 2007; Wendoh and Wallace 2005) indicates that male staff are resisting gender-mainstreaming programs through replication of the organizational culture that benefits them, and because DGs/ministers are benefiting most, we believe they are active opponents.

However, while men have a clear stake in the continuation of patriarchy (in the workplace and otherwise), women have a clear stake in its destruction. Discrimination against women in the workplace is prevalent and varied: sexual harassment (Quinn 2002), gender wage gaps and unequal access to positions of prestige or authority (Acker 1990; Ridgeway 1997; Williams 1995), and employers' preference for male workers (Ridgeway 1997)—every woman in the workplace is likely to encounter discrimination like this. And, of course, women face inequality outside the workplace as well. Relations of power in broader society "function as a social structure, as a pattern of constraint on social practice" (Connell 1987:107). Rape, violence against women, a male bank manager's refusal to loan to an unmarried woman—these are all instances of "power inequalities and ideologies of male supremacy" being reinforced through action (Connell 1987:107). Fortunately, many women evade such extreme instances of gender discrimination, but even they will face daily sexism that is milder yet no less sinister.

Just as men are engaged in active and subtle opposition to gender equality, women are engaged in its support (Connell 1987), which is most clearly visible among women leaders in the workforce. Research on managers in Swedish public and private organizations finds evidence that current woman managers strive to make things easier for future woman managers by challenging norms of masculinity and leadership in management (Wahl 2010). Atchison and Down (2009) argue that in most parliamentary democracies, cabinets are far more important to policy outcomes than legislatures, and show a positive correlation between the proportion of cabinet portfolios held by women and the number of weeks of parental and maternity leave guaranteed by the state. Women also tend to emphasize and successfully champion issues important to women through the legislative process more often than men (Thomas and Welch 2001). Rule and Hill (1996) note how women in legislatures in developed countries often focus on implementing policy that benefits women, like child support legislation and laws related to violence against women. Childs (2002) also found that increases in the number of women in legislatures lead to a more feminized agenda, while Celis (2006) found similarly that a small group of female members of Parliament (MPs) are able to adequately represent women's interests. Finally, Beaman et al. (2006) note that after one-third of seats were reserved for women in local Indian governments, spending began to respond to poor women's concerns. Women leaders are therefore clearly willing to support and advocate for other women.

Of course, we recognize that not all women act in accordance to some undercurrent of feminist activism. History shows us that women leaders (Margaret Thatcher comes to mind) can be as masculine as Sylvester Stallone, especially when positions of power are typically so closely associated with masculinity. Indeed, Childs and Krook (2009) argue that institutional norms, rules, and party ideology can affect the issues that women address in legislatures, while Goetz (2007) notes that female politicians' capacity for agency (in this case the capacity to engage in corrupt activity) is limited by gendered networks and institutionalized gender inequality of politics. Dym and Hutson (2005), after examining the literature on women's leadership in the profit versus nonprofit sector, also conclude that leadership style is contingent on the culture, norms, and objectives of the organization.

Despite these organizational constraints, we have reason to believe that female development organization DGs/ministers will be relatively supportive of gender mainstreaming. For one, women development organization staff appears to be in support of gender mainstreaming. Wendoh and Wallace (2005) note that the African development NGOs that have adopted gender-mainstreaming programming also tend to be those headed by women. Further, most development organization gender specialists tasked with enforcing gender-mainstreaming programs within the organization are women (Tiessen 2007), and Hendriks (2005) highlights that these women often risk social ostracism in order to maintain and promote gender-mainstreaming programs in their organization. Also, as more women make their way into leadership positions, norms of behavior surrounding these positions are becoming increasingly feminized (Wahl 2010). Given this review of the literature on gendered leadership, our hypothesis is that *female DGs/ministers of development agencies will allocate more funds to gender programming—focusing on gender-mainstreamed over gender-focused initiatives—than their male counterparts*. We argue this is the case because (1) female leaders want to support the women in and outside their organization, and (2) male leaders want to maintain the existing patriarchal gender order.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To test this hypothesis we first compiled data on the gender of the DGs/ministers for each of the 23 OECD DAC donors from 1995–2009. For simplicity of comparison we opted to focus only on these bilateral aid agencies, thereby excluding multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank, IMF, and other regional development banks. Through document analysis and direct contact with officials at various DAC agencies we were able to obtain data on the gender of the DGs of 22 of the 23 agencies, along with ministerial data for all 23 agencies.[7] These data were labeled "gender DG" and "gender minister" and coded as "0 = male, 1 = female." These leadership variables are our primary explanatory variables in the analysis that follows. For all analysis we elected to include a 1-year lag[8] for both leadership measures as it relates to ODA allocation. For instance, the leadership data for 2004 corresponds to spending data for 2005. This lag was introduced to help account for

[7] Obtaining these DG data in full proved difficult: while some were available online on various Web sites and OECD documents, many were not. Further, a few of the OECD DAC members whom we contacted did not respond, hence the missing data.

[8] We were unable to locate a source indicating the average lag between ODA commitment and disbursement; 1 year was chosen because of one of the author's time spent with the Canada International Development Agency.

the real lag in the aid project cycle that exists between a donor agency DG planning an ODA project and the time at which that ODA is actually disbursed.[9]

Next, we used the OECD's Creditor Reporting System online database to retrieve data on the ODA allocation of the 23 DAC agencies from 1995–2009, focusing on total ODA spending and total ODA spending for gender programs (all figures were collected in 2009 constant dollars to account for inflation over time). This represents aid flowing from the DAC donors to all possible ODA recipient countries in the time period—a sample of recipient countries spanning all regions of the developing world. The ODA spending for gender programs was broken into two categories based on existing DAC coding: "gender focused"—ODA spent on programs targeted specifically at gender issues or at one sex, often women, such as building wells closer to communities; and "gender mainstreaming"—ODA spent on any existing program in order to make it more sensitive to gender differences, or on initiatives like hiring more women staff and conducting gender education workshops for staff. We also calculate a total gender spending measure by adding the gender-focused and gender-mainstreamed amounts. After compiling the data set we were able to calculate the percentage of total ODA spent in each sector in a given year. These percentage measures of aid allocated to gender equality are the response variable in our analysis.

To examine our hypothesis regarding the effects of female leadership in aid agencies over time we employ a pooled time series analysis using random effects regression on our sample of donors from 1995 through 2006.[10] Our annual time series consists of a set of unbalanced panels: not every donor is represented in every year of the analysis owing to data availability. Aside from our explanatory and response measures outlined above, we also include several controls to account for the aid context in each country: ODA as percentage of gross national income (GNI)—a common measure of donor generosity; logged total ODA[11]—a common measure of the sheer volume of aid dollars provided by a donor; and a dummy measure indicating whether a donor country has instituted a corporate policy on women/gender or has a specific unit to address these issues within the agency (Swiss 2012).[12]

[9] One anonymous reviewer urged us to examine the potential influence of governing political parties' influence on these decision makers. We agreed with the reviewer that this is not a trivial factor, as previous research has demonstrated that the policies of political parties influence both the allocation of aid (Thérien and Noël 2000) and the empowerment of women in society (Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna 2012; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Swiss, Fallon, and Burgos 2012). While it is not feasible to track down the personal party affiliation of heads of development agencies in our sample, we were able to accurately track the political parties in power at the federal level in each of our sample donor countries and their placement on the political spectrum. To achieve this, we ran additional models that included a measure of whether the party in power in government was on the left of the political spectrum using the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2010). The results, however, failed to achieve a level of acceptable statistical significance, indicating that there was no salient effect on aid allocation to gender equality issues whether the governing party was to the left or right of the political spectrum. As such, we chose not to include these estimates in our results reported below, but the alternate results are available from the authors on request.

[10] Hausman tests between fixed effects and random effects specifications of our models show a preference for the more conservative random effects approach.

[11] We use the natural log of this measure to account for skewness.

[12] We control for the presence of a donor gender policy/unit because those agencies with either of these features in place would seem to be inherently more likely to allocate greater amounts of aid to gender issues. The coding of the gender policy/unit measure is taken from Swiss (2012).

RESULTS

Before examining the results of our multivariate analysis we calculated mean differences for our gendered leadership measures. Tables I and II show the mean aid allocated to the three gender equality spending categories by the gender of the agency leaders for DGs and ministers respectively. Two-tailed *t*-tests were used to test whether the mean differences between gendered leadership categories were significant.

In Table I we see statistically significant differences in ODA allocation between female and male DGs for both gender-focused and gender-mainstreamed programs. Male DGs allocate on average 3.1% more ODA toward gender-focused programs than do female DGs, while female DGs allocate an average of 5.7% more ODA toward gender-mainstreamed programs than their male counterparts.

Table II presents similar findings: While there are no statistically significant findings with regard to gender-focused spending, female ministers allocate on average 6.2% and 4.8% more ODA toward gender-mainstreamed and total gender-related spending, respectively, than male ministers.

Table III shows the results of our pooled time series analysis exploring how the gendered leadership variables affect allocation of ODA to gender programs, while controlling for ODA as percentage of GNI, logged total ODA, and whether the donor agency had a gender policy or unit in place at the time. In Model 2, the results reaffirm our previous findings that, net of other controls, female DGs are apt to allocate significantly more ODA—roughly 3.9% in this model—toward gender mainstreaming than male DGs. On the other hand, in Model 1, we see no statistically significant differences in spending on gender-focused programs. Furthermore, in Model 3, the 4.1% difference in ODA spending on all gender programs for

Table I. Mean Aid Allocation (% of Total ODA), Directors General (1-Year Lag)

	Male	Female	Difference
Gender-Focused ODA	8.80	5.73	3.070*
Gender-Mainstreamed ODA	13.87	19.54	–5.675*
Total Gender-Related ODA	21.88	25.27	–3.389
Observations (N)	246		

*$p < 0.05$ (two-sided test).

Table II. Mean Aid Allocation (% of Total ODA), Ministers (1-Year Lag)

	Male	Female	Difference
Gender-Focused ODA	7.60	6.07	1.526
Gender-Mainstreamed ODA	11.43	17.67	–6.232**
Total Gender-Related ODA	17.55	22.35	–4.800*
Observations (N)	300		

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$ (two-sided tests).

Table III. Effects of 1-Year Lagged Female Leadership on Allocation of ODA to Gender Equality, 1995–2009

	(1) FOCUS	(2) MAINSTREAM	(3) TOTAL	(4) FOCUS	(5) MAINSTREAM	(6) TOTAL
CONTROLS						
ODA as% of GNI	–0.924	3.392	2.620	–0.002	3.916	4.165
Logged Total ODA	–0.434	0.388	0.707	0.746	–0.043	1.884
Gender Unit/Policy in Place	2.087	9.281*	12.574**	3.244^	6.328*	11.579***
LEADERSHIP VARIABLES						
Female DG	0.005	3.899*	4.096^			
Female Minister				–1.940*	4.339**	1.123
Constant	8.941	6.360	8.217	–0.098	11.421	0.641
Observations (N)	227	225	232	270	251	277
Donors (N)	21	21	21	23	23	23
R^2 Overall	0.022	0.068	0.039	0.040	0.118	0.109
R^2 Within	0.001	0.054	0.072	0.026	0.058	0.074
R^2 Between	0.088	0.113	0.074	0.080	0.157	0.134

^p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-sided tests).

female DGs is marginally significant at the $p < .1$ level. Like female DGs, female ministers in Model 5 allocate significantly more ODA toward gender-mainstreaming programs than their male counterparts, 4.3% in this case. However, the results in Model 4 show that female ministers also spend on average 1.9% less ODA on gender-focused programs than do male ministers.

Looking to the control variables, ODA as percentage of GNI and logged total ODA have no statistically significant effect on ODA allocation toward gender programs; however, the presence of a gender unit or policy in a donor agency has substantial, statistically significant effects on the ODA ministered to gender-mainstreamed programming, as well as to total gender spending. Indeed, if a donor agency with a gender unit or policy is apt to allocate 9.3% more ODA toward gender-mainstreaming programs than one without in Model 2, and a sizable 6.3% more in Model 5. Likewise, the presence of a gender policy or unit increases total spending on gender programs by 12.6% and 11.6%, respectively, in Models 3 and 6.

We also ran additional models to determine what effect, if any, having both a female DG and minister has on ODA allocation; however, the results of these interactions are not reported here for lack of statistical significance. Further, we ran the models in Table III several more times while experimenting with different lags on the leadership variable—from 2 to 5 years—and found similar results to the 1-year lag, albeit not always statistically significant.[13]

LIMITATIONS

Before discussing our data and examining some possible explanations, we would like to lay bare a number of limitations. First, readers will undoubtedly take

[13] The longer period of lag used, the more observations we lose from the sample because of missing data on the gendered leadership explanatory variables. Thus we opted for the 1-year lag in our main analysis.

note of the low R-squared values indicating that our present analysis explains little of the variation in the gendered allocation of ODA by these donors. We acknowledge this limited explanatory power, but given that our research is intended to be exploratory in nature and does not seek to fully describe the differences found in ODA allocation between donors, we argue our results are valuable nonetheless. While we could have included numerous other controls in our analysis, we believe such inclusions would have taken away from what this article seeks to illustrate: that gender affects how DGs/ministers allocate ODA toward gender programs.[14] Future research may be better suited to a more comprehensive analysis.

Second, the OECD's credit reporting system is known to have issues with coding consistency—for example, the Canadian International Development Agency may code a project as gender mainstreaming whereas USAID may code the same project as gender focused. Coding issue aside, however, this is the most accurate and comprehensive data set on ODA allocation available.

DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

Does gendered leadership play a role in the allocation of foreign aid toward different forms of gender equality spending? As the results of our time series analyses show, female DGs are associated with significantly more ODA allocated toward gender-mainstreamed programs and marginally significant more total gender spending than their male counterparts; and female ministers allocate significantly more ODA toward gender-mainstreamed programs, and significantly less ODA toward gender-focused programs than do male ministers. These results lend support to our hypothesis that female DGs and ministers will allocate more ODA toward gender programs in general, and gender mainstreaming in particular, than do male DGs and ministers. Given that our hypothesis is supported, it will be fruitful to discuss the implications of gendered leadership in the development sector, the possibility of other factors influencing ODA allocation, and the future of gender mainstreaming.

Gender mainstreaming, unlike gender-focused programs, promotes equality not only in recipient communities but also in the gendered development organizations responsible for its initiation. The idea that gender equality can be successfully promoted only through an organization that is itself egalitarian (Rao and Kelleher 2005; Tiessen 2007) is essential here, and we believe that female DGs/ministers recognize and embrace this more readily than their male counterparts, who are interested in maintaining that inequality. Indeed, the male staff and management interviewed for Tiessen's (2007) research almost unanimously claimed that their organization was gender neutral, while female staff were more aware of the gender inequality that permeates these organizations. The folly of this perceived gender

[14] Because of the small number of donors and relatively limited time frame of our analysis, many of the countries share significant commonalities, meaning that there would likely be little variation in many conventional cross-national controls like region, religion, democracy, gross domestic product, and so on. For instance, only four regions/subregions are represented in our sample of donors: North America, Europe, Scandinavia, and Asia-Pacific. Given that some of these regional categories would only have a very small number of members (i.e., North America consisting of Canada and the United States), we chose not to include a regional control in our analysis.

neutrality is illustrated best when Tiessen (2007) highlights the experiences of female development NGO staff forced to make coffee for the male staff, deal exclusively with projects related to women and gender because they are women, and even beg the male staff for permission to use the agency's vehicle. These experiences are the result of male staff acting according to gendered roles that benefit them, and gender-mainstreaming programming threatens that patriarchal dividend.

Therefore, the most significant impediment to the implementation of, and steady commitment to, gender mainstreaming is the masculine organizational cultures of development organizations (Moser and Moser 2005; Rao and Kelleher 2005; Wendoh and Wallace 2005). Paradoxically, gender mainstreaming also happens to be well equipped to deal with the gendered attitudes and behaviors that maintain that hostile culture. What is needed, therefore, is the leadership of individuals who are willing to risk supporting gender-mainstreaming programs despite the resistance, for it is often leaders of great influence who transform these masculine cultures (Rao and Kelleher 2005).

It is important not to give up on gender mainstreaming too quickly. Gender mainstreaming seeks to undo attitudes and behaviors that maintain men's position of dominance—attitudes that have been essential to the social structure of our societies for generations. Surely, then, this is likely to be neither a quick nor simple process (Rao and Kelleher 2005), which is why the results of our study are so important. Our research shows that female DGs/ministers are supporting gender-mainstreaming programs, but arguably more significant is our finding that male DGs/ministers are resisting these programs. When viewed in conjunction with the qualitative literature on development organizations' gendered cultures, our findings provide a clearer picture of the kinds of resistance that gender-mainstreaming programs face.

Our findings have interesting implications for future sociological research on development organization leadership as well. First is the question of how best to interpret our results. Should the focus be on the female DGs'/ministers' support for gender- mainstreaming/total gender programs, as this indicates they are not paralyzed by their hostile work environment? Or should the focus be on the male DGs'/ministers' resistance to gender mainstreaming/gender programming, which points to patriarchal gender beliefs and behaviors that permeate these organizations? Clearly there is a need for qualitative research to follow up these findings—a better understanding of these gender dynamics will help policy makers create an equitable work environment that is more amenable to female leaders and gender-mainstreaming programming.

Second is the question of "what did we miss?" Our study looks exclusively at sex/gender for two reasons. For one this kept our analysis focused and concise. But more importantly, finding other relevant sociodemographic information on development organization leaders that could be used in a quantitative analysis was nigh impossible. Race/ethnicity is one such sociodemographic variable that we believe could help explain more of the variation in ODA allocation toward gender programs. Like gender, race/ethnicity has an effect on the behavior of leaders. Research shows that black leaders in high schools, principals, athletic directors, teachers, and so on—have greater respect for unconventional gender roles, strive to act as role models and advocates for black students, and generally see their white colleagues as opponents to black students (Brooks and Jean-Marie 2007).

Then there is the possibility of intersectionality, which posits that being a nonwhite woman means contending with "gendered racism"—a unique combination of sexism and racism that is greater than the sum of its parts (Jean-Marie et al. 2009:563). In the context of leadership this means that nonwhite women's leadership styles are not simply a combination of nonwhite and women's leadership styles —rather they come together to create a unique leadership style (Brooks and Jean-Marie 2007; Jean-Marie et al. 2009). In-depth qualitative research that looks into the life histories of development organization leaders could determine how race/ethnicity (and other sociodemographic variables) affect the leadership styles of DGs/ministers.

Past research also suggests that donors more closely linked to the ministry of foreign affairs in their respective country may make reforms within those agencies more difficult to achieve (Swiss 2011). The ministers of foreign affairs departments are therefore unlikely to be as supportive of gender-associated reforms in aid agencies that are closely linked to influence over the spending focus of the associated development agency. Future research could account for this relationship between donor and foreign policy arms of the DAC governments. Additional data could also help to strengthen the case we make here. Indeed, at the very least we would hope to eventually replicate this analysis with a larger sample by filling out this data set with data from the other DAC agencies and non-DAC donors for whom we have insufficient gendered leadership or spending data.

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