

European security and transatlantic relations after Kosovo and September 11

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Prepared for the 2nd International EU Symposium, 'Re-imagining the European Union: Dynamics of Enlargement in the 21st Century', Canadian Centre for Austrian and Central European Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1-2 March 2002.

1. Introduction

In mid-February, European Union's Commissioner for external relations Chris Patten and US Vice-President Dick Cheney exchanged rather harsh words concerning strategy in the current war against terrorism.¹ Patten's remarks, moreover, came in the wake of similar perplexities, more muffled for what concerned their tone but as clear-cut for what regarded their content, expressed by other European, Canadian, and even Japanese political leaders.²

This latest rift in the Atlantic Alliance was triggered by the use of the term 'axis of evil' by President Bush but its root causes are not new. At the core, the rift has to do with the different understandings Americans and Europeans have of their role in the Atlantic Alliance and the expectations that these generate with respect to behaviour. The Europeans wish to play the role of equal partners, dislike American unilateralist temptations, and are outspoken about it. As Commissioner Patten put it during the recent exchange: "Gulliver can't go it alone, and I don't think it's helpful if we regard ourselves as so Lilliputian that we can't speak up and say it". The Americans, on the other hand, regard themselves as charged with the responsibility to lead in the defence of Western values, ideals, and interests. As Vice-President Cheney put it speaking about the war on terrorism: "America has friends and allies in this cause, but only we can lead it. ... The United States and only the United States can see this effort through to victory." Hence, US policy

makers regard criticism coming from European allies as being always irritating and often also dangerous and counterproductive.

The problem caused by the different conceptions the two partners have of their roles is compounded by longstanding cultural and attitudinal differences. The Europeans, especially when they speak with a strong 'French accent', regard the US as a clumsy giant, having good intentions but little savoir-faire, who should seek guidance from his more experienced and sophisticated friends. The Americans, for their part, find it difficult to deal with an almost constant and, often cacophonous, criticism coming from a group of partners who take the higher moral ground and claim to know the best course of action but who, if and when push comes to shove, have relatively little to contribute. The Canadians, for their part, are often forgot in talks about transatlantic relations: Europeans tend to look at them as indistinguishable from the Americans and the latter often regard them as irksome as the Europeans.

This latest rift offers a convenient opportunity to reflect on the topic of transatlantic relations in the security issue area. This paper will briefly retrace the slow but steady process of incorporation of foreign, security, and defence policies into the competences of the European Community/Union. It will then identify some issues that cause tensions in the Atlantic Alliance, and finally it will offer some suggestions to overcome them and set the Alliance on a more cohesive course. A healthy and vigorous Alliance is in fact necessary not only for the security and welfare of Europe and North America but also for international governance.

From EDC to ESDP: the EC/EU and European foreign, security, and defence policies

Together with coal and steel, defence was one of the first issue areas that the original EC Six tried to integrate.³ The European Defence Community (EDC) - conceived in 1950 and shelved

in 1954 after the French National Assembly failed to ratify its founding treaty - provided for the integration of military forces, a joint command structure, a single budget, joint armament programmes, and of course a common foreign policy that was to be developed within a parallel European Political Community. Ironically perhaps, given its recent misgivings about a similar and less ambitious plan, the impetus to form the EDC came from the US, its main objective being to rearm Germany without raising the fears of its neighbours, and of France in particular. The failure of EDC led neo-functionalist theorists to argue that for the integration process to be successful it had to stay clear, at least in its early stages, of 'high politics'. Perhaps also for this reason, when the French resurrected the idea of European foreign policy cooperation in the early 1960s through the Fouchet plan, such cooperation was conceived as taking place strictly at the intergovernmental level. The plan however failed because Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries saw it as a Gaullist ploy to erode the supra-nationalism of EC institutions, and undermine NATO cohesion.

The seminal 1969 Hague summit launched a project for the coordination of EC member states' foreign policies other than trade and commercial policies for which Community institutions were already responsible under the provisions of the Rome Treaty. Such a project, named European Political Cooperation (EPC) was later defined and refined in the 1970 Davignon report and the 1973 Copenhagen report. EPC simply demanded a political commitment on the part of the foreign ministers to consult each other on foreign policy issues. In 1981, with the London report, EC member states broadened the EPC agenda to include "political" aspects of security. An attempt by two more supra-nationalist foreign ministers (the German Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the Italian Emilio Colombo) to bring EPC closer to the Community structure and method failed and the process remained intergovernmental, based on consensus, and outside the EC institutional framework.

Only in 1986, with the Single European Act (SEA), did EPC receive its first mention in a Community legal document. Article 30 of the SEA stated that EC member countries would “endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy” as well as develop “a European identity in external policy matters.” The same article set up a small administrative unit within the General Secretariat of the Council in Brussels to assist the presidency in the management of EPC, and provided for the periodical re-examination of EPC provisions.

The new integrative dynamism provided by the SEA as well as the end of the Cold War and its consequent changes in the international environment led a further strengthening of EPC in the early 1990s. The Maastricht Treaty (or TEU) transformed the EPC process into a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and brought it under a common roof with the EC by making it the ‘second pillar’ of the newly established European Union. From now on, moreover, CFSP would also “include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence.” The Maastricht Treaty also designated the Western European Union (WEU) - the only exclusively European, although until then practically dormant, defence organization – as responsible for implementing the defence aspects of CFSP.

The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty brought further institutional developments, the most important of which was the creation of the position of High Representative for the CFSP. It also expanded the security and defence aspects of CFSP by introducing the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ i.e. giving the EU competence for “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.”

Notwithstanding all these institutional developments, the effectiveness of the CFSP throughout the 1990s remained rather limited as the failure of the EU to play a significant role in

the long Balkan crisis demonstrated. The recognition of this existing weakness led EU member states to launch an ambitious European defence project. During the early stages of the Kosovo crisis, for instance, most EU members leaned towards the idea of establishing a *cordon sanitaire* in Albania and Macedonia. Its purpose would have been to stop the flow of personnel, weapons, and supplies to the KLA (the armed organization of the Kosovo Albanian nationalists, which used terrorist means to pursue its objective), and thus offer Serbia an incentive to loosen its grip on Kosovo. Since the Europeans lacked the military capability, as well as political cohesion, necessary to implement this option, they had to accept the option favoured by the US, which was to issue a NATO threat to Milosevic. When the threat failed to deter the Serbs, EU members had no choice but to engage militarily but in ways that were predominantly decided by the US (Croci 2000).

A decisive moment towards the setting up of common defence came at the 1998 St. Malo French-British summit meeting. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, reversing a long-standing British position on this issue, announced that his government would welcome a serious and autonomous role for the EU in security and defence matters, as long as it would be exercised in conformity with NATO obligations (Deighton 2000, Howorth 2000). The St. Malo declaration announced that the EU needed “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”

At its June 1999 meeting in Cologne (while bombs were being dropped on Serbia), the European Council outlined the decision-making structures for the new European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP). In December of the same year, in Helsinki, it decided that the EU would meet the so-called ‘headline goal’ (also called Military Security Pool or European Rapid Reactions Force) by the year 2002. Such a goal calls for readying a rapid-reaction force of some 60,000

soldiers, with air and naval components, deployable in 60 days, and capable of sustaining at least a year of operations in the field. The Nice Treaty set up within the Council new permanent political and military bodies to provide political guidance and strategic direction to ESDP (i.e. a Standing Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee, and the Military Staff). It also suggested that the major functions of the WEU (except those related to the mutual military assistance clause) be brought into the EU.⁴ Further evolution in this process of inserting security and defence competences into the EU can be expected to come from the next IGC to be held in 2004.

The history of CFSP/ESDP shows that a dynamic of convergence has been at work. Mechanisms have been set up to help member states coordinate their foreign and defence policies and eventually help them formulate a 'European' policy. Such a process has not yet led to a 'communitarisation' of European foreign policy but has increasingly involved Community institutions in its development. It seems logical to conclude that such a process is irreversible although it might stagnate at certain levels or "plateaus" before moving forward again (Regelsberger and Wessels, forthcoming).

At the moment, EU 'foreign policy' is conducted through a variety of means and forums. Trade and commercial issues (which have traditionally been at the top of EU-US relations), development and humanitarian aid, and issues concerning enlargement are conducted through the Communitarian process (Pillar I), although overseen by different Commissioners. Some issues related to immigration, refugees and internal security are in the intergovernmental Pillar III. All other issues are in Pillar II of the EU and in a state of institutional flux. Hence, CSFP/ESDP is a project that, although much more advanced than EPC, still lacks decision-making "coherence" (Missiroli 2001) and operational capabilities. It can best be regarded as an example of what Kohler-Koch (forthcoming) calls "network governance." Thus, ESDP does not cover collective defence,

which remains the responsibility of NATO. If EU members decide through ESDP to intervene in a crisis militarily, they must borrow the necessary capability from NATO (this, incidentally, has created some problems with Turkey and to a lesser extent with Canada). The financial dimension of ESDP remains the responsibility of EU member states, and nuclear capability of two member states, plus the US. Relations with the US, moreover, to speak only of the security area, take place both directly and multilaterally, as well as in different forums (NATO, OSCE, UN, EU-US dialogue, G-7, to name just a few).

The nature of transatlantic tensions

During its first forty years of existence, the Atlantic Alliance allowed Europe to concentrate on the business of integration under the security mantle provided by the US. For Canada, the Alliance was the major forum in which to exercise its counterweight diplomacy (Rempel 1996, Haglund 2000). The US accepted the bargain because of a perceived strategic imperative and the expectation that the Europeans would eventually increase their contribution to common security. Although the Europeans never fulfilled this expectation, the US put up with it and somewhat grudgingly continued to play its hegemonic role. EU recent efforts to begin playing the role that the US always expected it to play rather than being enthusiastically welcomed by the US created at first a number of misgivings in Washington. These concerned the impact that ESDP and its military capability might have on NATO cohesion, as well as differences of views on a number of substantive issues.⁵

Although there were different schools of thought and shades of opinion in Congress, the executive, as well as academic circles,⁶ the main American concern was that ESDP might undermine NATO cohesion. The US feared that it would find it harder, and that it would take

longer, to reach consensus with one equal partner, than with a number of weaker and hence more pliable ones. It is after all logically to assume that a EU with a cohesive CFSP/ESDP and adequate military capabilities would become as assertive in the field of security as it has been in trade and commercial relations (i.e. in an issue area in which the relationship has been more balanced and has been centrally handled by the Commission). Hence, the Americans at first (during the Clinton Administration) paid lip service to the European initiative but also issued a set of warnings, the so-called three D's: no *decoupling* of EU security from that of its other NATO allies, no *duplication* of NATO capabilities, and no *discrimination* of NATO members which are not EU members.⁷ The Bush administration, on the other hand, seems to have openly endorsed ESDP, even if it seems to assume that it simply means the mounting of peacekeeping missions in those cases when the US prefers not to involve NATO (Schake 2002: 6).

Transatlantic differences on substantive issues are rooted in different assumptions about the nature of international politics. At the beginning of the 20th century, Europeans practised 'Realpolitik' whereas Americans approached international politics from a 'liberal' perspective. At the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, European diplomats regarded President Wilson as a "hopeless utopian" and his famous fourteen points as "lofty principles." The decline of European states from their position of 'global powers', the rise of the US to this status (and the 'political practices' that such status requires) as well as the fact that International Politics as an academic discipline in the US was influenced by European (and especially German) expatriates, have slowly reversed these differences. Today the US practices primarily 'Realpolitik' whereas the EU and Canada prefer a practice based on liberal internationalism. These two outlooks result in a number of differences on substantive issues.

First, the EU and US have two different conceptions of security. Whereas the US regards security globally, the EU thinks of it regionally, i.e. limitedly to Europe itself and its neighbouring areas. The US regards the main security threats as coming from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ‘rogue states’, and terrorism. The EU looks at security threats (Europeans actually prefer to call them ‘challenges’) as deriving from ethnic conflict and political-economic instability in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the southern shores of the Mediterranean, and from non-geographical challenges such as poverty, international crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, migratory pressures, and more recently terrorism.

Second, for the EU the means to counter these threats are the progressive integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the Union, and the projection of liberal-democratic values (and hence stability) as well as the provision of economic assistance to Russia and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean.⁸ For what concerns non-geographical threats, the EU seems to regard them as being external to its territory and capable of being defused through a strengthening of the EU internal cohesion, external borders, and elusive concepts such as ‘global governance’ and ‘managing globalization’.

Last but not least, whereas the Europeans prefer to operate patiently through multilateral institutions in order to construct a rule-based international system, the Americans seem to have less patience with multilateral processes and do not hesitate, when they perceived it as necessary, to resort to great-power politics. Briefly, much like what happened during the Cold War, the US behaves like a superpower with global responsibility while the EU continues to regard itself as a ‘civilian power’, preferring moral persuasion and mediation to the use of coercive means, especially military ones, and wishing to address the root causes of conflicts rather than treating their symptoms.⁹

Canada's concept of security and perception of threats might be similar to those of the US but its preference for diplomatic action through multilateral forums and institutions make it often appear to be more closely aligned with the European position. The fact that Canada lies on the American side of the Atlantic, however, makes it more circumspect than the Europeans are when it comes to voice disagreement with US.

These basic differences have manifested themselves also after the terrorist attack of September 11. Both Europeans and Canadians did not hesitate to express their sympathies and support, and NATO went as far as to invoke the treaty's mutual defence guarantee (Art. 5) for the first time in its 52 years of existence. However, even if they understood and accepted that part of the response to September 11 might have to be military, they immediately expressed their preference for a 'preventative' as opposed to 'punitive' strategy. The military effort, moreover, if absolutely necessary should be limited as much as possible to Afghanistan (the pre-modern Taliban regime was, after all, thoroughly and widely despised) and more precisely to terrorist targets (whatever that might mean precisely). They also stated that any military action should have the greatest degree of legitimacy and hence should receive the 'imprimatur' of the UN Security Council. Finally, in their desire to address the 'root causes' of the problem, both Europeans and Canadians (the latter in a more restrained way) emphasized the need to find a solution to regional problems, such as the Palestinian one (Gordon 2001: 94-96, Howorth 2002).

How to smooth transatlantic relations

After the misgivings and reluctance that characterized the Clinton Administration, it would seem that the Bush Administration has accepted the European decision to 'come of age' in the security dimension. To sustain this process, the US could increase contacts with the EU as a whole

(particularly the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Affairs) as opposed to working primarily through national capitals. Most of all, however, the US should consult more fully with the EU and Canada before it embarks on critical policy initiatives rather than briefing its partners once these are off the ground. It should also avoid giving the impression that it considers the EU simply a strategic tool, and therefore ease its pressure on the EU to accept Turkey into its fold immediately. Such enlargement might eventually take place but its timing cannot be simply a function of a perceived strategic necessity since the EU is a complex political, economic, social, and cultural organism.

The EU should extend its 'security horizon' and begin to think more in terms of international, global security, even if its range of action is likely to remain confined to its immediate neighbourhood. This means that the EU should stop expressing publicly its disapproval of US actions beyond Europe. Nothing irritates the US more than European officials joining some Russian, Chinese, or Islamic anti-American chorus. Strong public expressions of disagreement, moreover, are likely to contribute to deterrence failures. It would appear, for instance, that Slobodan Milosevic did not back down before NATO military intervention or during its early phase because he did not expect Alliance solidarity and cohesion to prevail (Silvestri 1999: 11). The Europeans should rather try to make a bigger effort to sell their views to those actors in the US (Congress in particular) who tend towards isolationist or unilateralist positions. By so doing, they would be already more earnestly contributing to the analysis and evaluations of threats and the selections of the most appropriate means to respond to them. They should also offer more often to participate with the US in operations beyond Europe. Such operations may include humanitarian and economic assistance, as well as diplomatic, economic sanctions, and military interventions. The offer of such contribution, however, presupposes certain capabilities.

Hence, the EU should continue to concentrate on achieving a more cohesive and coherent CFSP/ESDP, and developing adequate capabilities, including military ones. The EU recent effort to give itself the means to perform the so-called 'Petersberg tasks' in its immediate periphery without depending on the US is laudable. The 'headline goal', however, unless it is meant only as a means to strengthen EU 'external identity' or increase EU 'political weight' (Larsen 2000: 345), presupposes a cohesive CFSP/ESDP. A certain degree of ambiguity concerning new projects has often proved constructive in the process of European integration. Yet, meeting the 'headline goal' will be of little use unless the EU develops a tested and reliable institutional structure capable of deciding when such a force might be used and which objectives it is supposed to achieve if and when used (Andréani 2000, Heisbourg 2000). EU member states in fact do not yet agree on whether or not regional organizations such as NATO should obtain a UN Security Council vote to intervene militarily in out-of-area crises, even when such interventions are justified on humanitarian grounds. Concepts such as those of humanitarian intervention, peacemaking, and peace-enforcement, moreover, have not yet been clarified, and their international legal status remains ambiguous.

The building of such an institutional capacity within the EU (which was begun in Nice) should proceed *pari passu* with the establishment of clear and effective institutional links with NATO. This will serve not only to reassure the Americans that there is no residual Gaullist thinking behind ESDP but also to ensure that the EU works well with NATO now that both institutions will share responsibility for managing security. The recent crisis in Macedonia has been a good and successful testing ground for NATO-EU coordination and cooperation.

To speed up the improvement of military capability, the EU should also oversee and coordinate the upgrading and integration of national defence programmes. To this end it could set up a Europe-wide target for national defence budgets, and create a special EU defence budget to

finance common missions, and weapons programmes (Andréani, Bertram and Grant 2001).¹⁰ EU members should probably increase their spending on 'hard security' by as much as the US perhaps should on 'soft security' (Heisbourg 1999). The EU should also devote at least as much time and effort it devoted to the promotion of EMU and the Euro to promote defence culture in Europe. Such a promotion would translate in support and legitimacy for this new important phase of integration and facilitate increases in defence spending domestically, especially in those countries (e.g. Italy) where a defence culture is particularly weak.

A cohesive and coherent CFSP/ESDP must also be one that accepts that the use of military force might at times be necessary even if, as Commissioner Patten likes to argue (Deighton 2000: 49), force might indeed be only the final dimension of security. The development of a military capability should not lead the EU to conceive every problem or crisis as being amenable to a military solution but should lead it to consider military force as a legitimate and useful instrument of foreign policy, even if only in certain circumstances. Briefly, the EU should reintroduce some 'realist' elements in its predominantly 'liberal' understanding of international relations and conflicts.

On a more general level, addressing the root causes of problems through 'constructive engagement' in the political-economic field, might not always work and it might be positively dangerous when dealing with what the Americans call 'rogue states' that both seek weapons of mass destruction and abet terrorism.¹¹ In these cases, one might have to deal with symptoms before addressing the causes. The Europeans insist that a policy of 'constructive engagement' with moderate forces in what they prefer to call 'problem states' is much more likely to bring results than the American coercive policy that often consists of more rhetoric than substance. This might well be true, but Europeans must recognize that 'constructive engagement' is a policy that requires

not only incentives but also the threat of punishment, if incentives fail to work. The stick, in other words, must complement the carrot and cannot be eliminated or hidden if one wishes the carrot to work.

To remain within the confines of the current transatlantic diatribe, it would seem that the proper policy stance to adopt vis-à-vis the three ‘rogue’ or ‘problem’ states mentioned in the ‘axis of evil’ speech is different in each case. In the case of Iraq, where Saddam Hussein is solidly in control, a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ seems at this point utterly futile and even counterproductive. European reluctance to subscribe to a policy of coercion, and the muffled criticism that goes with it, does not achieve any purpose other than encouraging the Iraqi dictator in his defiant stance. In the case of Iran, where a domestic ‘moderate’ (at least in Islamic terms) faction exists, the European preference for ‘constructive engagement’ seems more defensible, at least in the short run. Such a policy, however, makes sense only if closely tied to a strong and clear invitation to Teheran leaders to stop abetting terrorist groups, beginning with the Lebanese-Palestinian Hizbollah group. If such ‘invitation’ does not yield the desired results, coercive action becomes necessary. Hence, in the current phase, Americans should support the European policy of ‘constructive engagement’ but Europeans should not hesitate to consider a more coercive course of action if ‘constructive engagement’ fails to yield results. Finally, in the case of North Korea, the European preference for a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ seems more appropriate than the vague, coercive threats mentioned by President Bush. This is not only because South Korea and Japan advocate it strongly but also because North Korea has no connections with Islamic terrorism and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is less obsessive than that of Iraq and Iran and seems to pose a less clear and imminent danger.

In the Middle East, to mention another problematic issue, the EU (and to a lesser extent this goes also for Canada) should stop expressing muffled disapproval of the supposedly pro-Israeli bias of the US and manifesting a veiled sympathy for the Palestinian plight. Such an attitude, in fact, is not likely to end the current spiral of violence nor is it likely to solve the conflict in a more permanent way. The EU and Canada should instead recognize that it is necessary to make it clear to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as well as to the terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hizbollah (and their state sponsors) that the time has come to put an end, immediately, completely, and unconditionally, to all acts of terrorism. The EU is a good position to issue such an ultimatum since it finances a considerable portion of the budget of the PNA. Only then, can the EU, together with the US, put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the territories and renew the search for a definitive solution. As long as Palestinians continue the inhuman practice of sending suicide terrorists into Israel, one can hardly ask the latter to stop defending itself militarily, even if the military response only escalates the spiral of conflict. The spiral must be broken by stopping terrorist attacks and not by calling into question a state's right to self-defence, which would be tantamount to handing terrorism a second victory, after the one it achieved in Kosovo.

Canada too has a role to play in the reinvigoration of the Atlantic Alliance. The withdrawal in the early 1990s of its troops in Europe signified, according to some observers, the relinquishment of its traditional role in the North-Atlantic triangle and even the weakening of its internationalism (Rioux and Hay 1997). Although some Canadian politicians and media pundits talk of an incipient 'Pacific Century' for Canada, the Atlantic remains, as recently and cogently argued by David Haglund (2000), the key area in Canadian foreign policy grand-strategy. Indeed, if one were to replace the adjective 'British' with 'European', and the nouns 'improvement' and 'creation' with

‘deterioration’ and ‘reinvigoration’ respectively, this passage by Sir Robert Falconer, written in the mid-1920s, would be a very good prescription for Canadian policy today:

We (Canadians) pluck up our courage as we contemplate the steady [deterioration] in the relations between the [European] and the American peoples. If ever a new order is to be ushered in, the day will surely begin with the [reinvigoration] of sympathy between them. For the hastening of such a day Canada in her history, her character and her position, holds a unique privilege, and, if she takes advantage of it, the world of the future will judge that she will have played a part given to few nations in the progress of humanity (Falconer 1926: 250-1).

Although in need of reinvigoration, the Atlantic relationship is not all doom and gloom. Apart from the diatribe concerning the ‘axis of evil’ speech, for instance, both the EU and Canada seem to be largely satisfied with the Bush Administration’s war on terrorism. Bush's initiatives have so far been more planned and prudent, as well as negotiated, than the knee-jerk and unilateral response provided by the Clinton administration in its 1998 bombing of two small targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. Ironically, the European main regret seems to be that of not having been invited to become more involved militarily. The usual problems, however, are likely to come to the surface again if the US will conclude that the war of terrorism has to continue beyond Afghanistan.

If the Kosovo crisis triggered the emergence of a more autonomous Europe with responsibility for policing its own immediate neighbourhood, September 11 might accelerate such a trend since the US will be obliged to focus its attention and resources on other parts of the world. September 11 has also brought the two Atlantic partners psychologically closer together perhaps for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War. Differences over the evaluation of security threats and the choice of means to deal with them will of course remain, but they are healthy if properly managed, that is if the two partners are conscious of being in the same geopolitical boat, and therefore need not be feared. America’s main fear about Europe should be a Europe that is divided and weak, especially in the security and defence areas. Europe’s main fear about America,

should be an America that is inward looking and reluctant to continue to play the always challenging but rarely gratifying role of global hegemon. In so far as its vital interests are linked to the endurance of a vibrant transatlantic relationship, Canada's crucial role is still the same as that identified by Sir Robert Falconer some eighty years ago: help Europeans and Americans understand each other better.

¹ On this exchange, see “Jaw-jaw, not war-war,” *Financial Times*, 14 February 2002 and “Remarks by Vice President Dick Cheney Before the Council on Foreign Relations,” *New York Times*, 15 February 2002. See also “Breaking the silence” and “Patten lashes into Bush’s America,” *The Guardian*, 9 February 2002, “Cheney rejects criticism by Allies over stand on Iraq,” *New York Times*, 16 February 2002, and “Allies hear sour notes in ‘axis of evil’ chorus,” *ibid.* 17 February 2002.

² See, for instance, “Europeans reject Bush ‘axis of evil’ on Iran,” *Financial Times*, 4 February 2002, “Japan joins critics of ‘axis of evil’ speech,” *ibid.* 15 February 2002, and “PM rejects US attack on Saddam,” *National Post*, 15 February 2002.

³ The key documents on the evolution of European foreign policy are collected in Hill and Smith (2000).

⁴ For a collection of the core documents on the evolution of ESDP between St. Malo and Nice, see Rutten (2001).

⁵ For a discussion of some of these differences, see Everts (2001).

⁶ For an analysis of these different school of thoughts and opinions, see Kupchan (2000); Sloan (2000); Zielonka (2000).

⁷ *Financial Times*, 7 December 1998. Later, NATO Secretary General George Robertson rephrased the three D’s into a more friendly three I’s. He argued that ESDP should be based on *improvement* in European defence capabilities, *inclusiveness* and transparency for all Allies, and the *indivisibility* of transatlantic security based on shared values (Sloan 2000: 18).

⁸ On February 26, for instance, the EU announced a proposal for the establishment of a new development bank for Mediterranean and Middle East countries. Such a proposal seems to be dictated by cosmetic, foreign policy considerations more than by economic, developmental ones. “New Middle East development bank proposed” *Financial Times*, 26 February 2002.

⁹ For a more detailed treatment of the European conception of security, see Larsen (2000). On the concept of ‘civilian power’, see Stavridis (2001).

¹⁰ Although this is not the focus of this paper, it should be noted that according to some analysts (e.g. Shake 2002), because of different force postures, budgets, and policy priorities, the gap between US forces and European ones is increasing fast and that hence a certain degree of “constructive duplication” of capabilities should actually be encouraged. US cooperation in this field seem to be evidenced by the fact that Washington intends to ease unnecessary restrictions on technology transfer and industrial co-operation, and by liberalising its export policies in order to improve the quality of capabilities available to Europeans, and diminish any problems Allied forces have in working together. “Washington must bridge gap with NATO allies,” *Financial Times*, 18 February 2002.

¹¹ For more details on transatlantic differences on how to deal with ‘rogue states’, see Haas ed. (1999).

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